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379- JMW (315)-3.3 5-3 Tral - File - 315th JMW Regt.
29th JMW Div. Jan 95

JOHN C. COLE
1944-1945
1946-1947

S-3 Reports

Vol. XIII

317

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
rmg

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379-INF-(315)-3.3

Master

DECLASSIFIED

NVD 735017

AUTHORITY

BY Fw NARA DATE: 1-26

PATROL INSTRUCTIONS

315th Inf. 28 Jan. 45

28
29 Jan. 45

1. 2nd Bn. will send Patrol "F" between 2000 and 2400 and 3rd Bn will send Patrol "I" between 0200 and 0600 on routes indicated (Overlay).
2. Composition;
 - a. One Rifle squad heavily armed with automatic weapons and grenades both fragmentation and W.P.
 - b. Each patrol furnished one assault boat by the Engineers.
3. Mission;
 - a. Capture a prisoner and destroy an En. installation.
 - b. If unsuccessful, reconnoiter for future raiding party.
4. Reports;
 - a. Without delay upon return.

SCHRIEVER,
Major, S-2

DECLASSIFIED

NND 735017

AUTHORITY

BY FW NARA DATE: 1-26

315 INF.
Patrol Routes
28 Jan 45
Map 1:25,000

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
Office of the Security Officer
APO 46, U.S. Army

SECRET

By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials *[Signature]*
22 January 1945

22 January 1945

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS)

NUMBER 1)

1. In accordance with Operations Instructions No. 22, Hq VI Corps, dated 222100A January 1945, the following instructions are issued. See overlay for area of responsibility VI Corps Security Officer.

2. Warning System.

a. All units will be especially watchful for an attempted paratroop attack or infiltration by the enemy (day or night) and prepared to relay information concerning such attack as outlined below.

b. Upon confirmation of an attack, divisions will pass information to Corps Antiaircraft Operations Room (AAOR) through their supporting AAA battalion headquarters.

c. Information received from AAOR by the divisional AAA unit will be immediately relayed to the division for dissemination to its subordinate units.

d. AAA units will immediately transmit, by the fastest available means, information of an attempted attack to the Corps AAOR, normally over the Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service (AAAIS) net.

e. Corps units (non-divisional) will transmit this information by wire to HQ 35th AAA Brigade (LANCE 2 or 3 through REDWOOD).

f. When it is definitely established that an attack is in progress, the AAOR will broadcast the information over the AAAIS net (2280 kc) to all units within VI Corps area.

g. In transmitting confirmed information of enemy attacks, the following form will be used by all units:

EXAMPLE: ROTTEN EGGS	SIX (6)	Q-601152
Paratroopers,		
agents, or		
saboteurs	Number	Coordinates

Code word signifying paratroopers, agents, or saboteurs, will be changed periodically by this headquarters.

3. Motorized Security Patrols.

a. "C" Troop, 94th Cav Rcn Sq, will maintain continuous patrols in areas indicated on attached overlay to check security of military installations, arrest suspicious individuals, and arrest civilians violating curfew regulations. Civilians arrested will be turned over to VI Corps CIC, military personnel will be brought to the closest PW cage. (See attached letter, Hq VI Corps, subject: "Counterintelligence Instructions", dated 1 December 1944.)

b. Local police (Gendarme) will accompany each patrol for the purpose of checking their own personnel at important points within the area as well as acting as interpreters for our patrols.

c. The C.O., "C" Troop, 94th Rcn Sq (Mecz), will monitor the AAAIS net (2280 kc) at his CP and will establish radio communication with his patrols.

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Patrols will be mounted in radio equipped vehicles. 35th AAA Brigade will establish wire communication with the Rcn Troop CP.

d. In event of an attack the C.O., "C" Troop, 94th Rcn Sq (Mecz), will be prepared to immediately dispatch two (2) platoons to threatened area until the mobile reserve (see par 4, below) can be moved to the area.

4. Mobile Reserve.

a. The mobile reserve will consist of the 256th Engr C Bn, one (1) company of which will be on a one (1) hour alert status, and the remainder on a four (4) hour alert status.

b. This battalion will be subject to call by the Commanding General, 35th AAA Brigade, for the protection of the VI Corps area.

c. The C.O., 256th Engr C Bn, will monitor the AAAIS net (2200 kc) at his CP.

d. The 35th AAA Brigade will provide sufficient trucks to C.O., 256th Engr C Bn, to make his unit mobile.

e. Upon arrival of the mobile reserve in the threatened area, the C.O., 256th Engr C Bn, will assume command of the situation.

f. If ordered out, a maximum number of automatic weapons will be carried by this unit.

5. Perimeter Defense of Occupied Towns and Areas.

a. The senior line commander of the units occupying a village or town rear of division rear boundaries will be responsible for its defense and will establish and coordinate the defense of such areas. He will make maximum use of personnel and weapons within the village, town or area. Personnel will be required to be proficient in the use of their own weapons, and capable of employing other available equipment and weapons as local conditions may necessitate. This proficiency will be checked by the senior commander who will institute training procedure where required. He will maintain rehearsed defense plans for his area of responsibility.

b. Check posts will be established at positions controlling routes of approach to the village or town to determine the identity of passing vehicles and their occupants. Spot checks will be made of passing civilian and military pedestrians. Detailed instructions to personnel manning them will be as ordered by the commander of the unit operating the post. The general procedure will be as follows:

(1) All single vehicles will be stopped and the identity of the occupants checked.

(2) The leading vehicle of a convoy will be stopped for identification of the convoy. When properly identified, the remaining vehicles of the convoy will be permitted to pass the post without stopping.

(3) Civilian vehicles will be permitted to pass only when the occupants are properly identified and the driver can present his authority to travel.

(4) US Military personnel may be identified by use of the parole and countersign recognition procedure. They may be checked further by replies to questions of familiar facts known to all Americans, for example: "What is the price of airmail stamps?"; "In what state is Denver?"

(5) French military personnel may be identified by the password and by French Army credentials. FFI personnel carry only French civilian credentials.

(6) Military personnel and suspicious civilian personnel who do not satisfactorily establish their identity will be taken to the nearest PW cage for further interrogation.

S E C R E T

(7) Check post personnel will be courteous but positive in their actions. They will signal vehicles to stop in sufficient time for the driver to recognize the signal and stop safely. They will require passing personnel to identify themselves and will not assist such personnel by telling them the password, nor will they accept the wearing of officer insignia as bona fide evidence of the wearer's identification.

c. Patrols of "C" Troop, 94th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz), and staff officers, 35th AAA Brigade, will investigate the effectiveness of check posts, perimeter defenses, Military Police, and sentinels on important installations within the area shown on attached overlay.

d. All units in areas other than towns or villages will provide for close-in security of their bivouacs.

e. In the event of an enemy attack, all units within the sector shown on attached overlay, except those designated herein, will remain in place.

6. Security Training.

Continuous training on security by all Corps units will be conducted (attached Intelligence Memorandum No. 1, Headquarters 35th AAA Brigade, dated 22 January 1945, will be used as material for initial instruction).

By command of Major General BROOKS:

J. P. TOWNSEND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
VI Corps Security Officer

OFFICIAL:

Francis C. Grevenberg
FRANCIS C. GREVENBERG
Lt Col, CAC
S-3

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"Special"


3 Incls:

- #1 - Overlay, Area of Responsibility
- #2 - Letter, HQ, VI Corps, dated 1 December 1944
- #3 - Intelligence Memorandum #1, Hq 35th AAA Brigade, dated 22 January 1945

S E C R E T

Overlay showing area of responsibility
 of VI Corps Security Officer
 Areas 1, 2, & 3 will be patrolled by
 "C" Troop, 94th Rcn Sq (Mecz)

HQS VI Corps Security
 Officer
 Map: FRANCE, 1:200,000
 Sheet No. 87
 22 Jan 1945



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO 758 U.S. Army

AG 250 - CG

15 September 1944

SUBJECT: Conduct of Troops in ALSACE

TO : Commanding Officers, All Units (U.S.) Seventh Army

1. You will soon enter the Province of ALSACE where the vast majority of the people speak either German or a German sounding dialect.

2. However, bear constantly in mind that the Alsations are French and have been French for 300 years, and are to be treated as other Allied liberated populations. As in other parts of France, American forces will not constitute a Military Government.

3. There will, however, be present a substantial number of Germans who have taken the place of hundreds of thousands of real Alsations, who either fled to France to remain French or else were brutally deported by the German government.

4. Because of the presence of this hostile enemy minority, Troops must be more circumspect and security minded than in the other parts of France which we have just traversed.

5. Misconduct towards the population will not be tolerated under any conditions and will be severely dealt with. The excuse that a person was taken for a German because he spoke German will not be accepted under any circumstances.

6. It is directed that this memorandum be read to all Troops:

/s/ A. M. Patch
/t/ A. M. PATCH,
Lieut. General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

Distribution: "C"

Reproduced at Headquarters 35th AAA Brigade 24 January 1945.

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

AG 350.09

1 December 1944

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Instructions.

TO : Commanders, All Units

1. a. As the German border is approached, the problem of operational security against subversive activity becomes increasingly important. Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Police and Civil Affairs are trained organizations within the Army designed to cope with this problem. However, their accomplishments can be more effective and the enemy's intelligence activities completely neutralized only with the cooperation of every officer and enlisted man.

b. General provisions for conduct of troops in ALSACE are covered in Letter, Headquarters Seventh Army, Subject: "Conduct of troops in ALSACE" dated 15 September 1944 (See copy attached).

2. The following security measures, many of which are already in effect, will be brought to the attention of every officer and enlisted man and will be strictly enforced:

a. No civilians in any capacity will be employed by any unit until after they have been approved by the A C of S, G-2.

b. Suspicious persons found loitering in or near military installations will be arrested immediately and referred to A C of S, G-2 for investigation.

c. No unauthorized person will be allowed to enter military installations at any time. Under no circumstances will civilians be allowed within a military installation until after they have been properly investigated and issued official identifications.

d. All installations such as command posts and bivouacs will be posted, and no civilians will be allowed to enter except as a military requirement (interrogation, etc.)

e. No individual will be permitted to cross our lines into enemy territory without prior authorization of the A C of S, G-2 of the unit involved.

f. Civilians observed carrying or using any type of camera or binoculars will be apprehended immediately and held, together with the instruments. The carrying or use of cameras and binoculars by civilians is expressly prohibited by proclamations which are posted in all towns and villages.

g. The transporting of unauthorized civilians in government vehicles is prohibited.

h. Damage to military property which appears to be intentional will be reported immediately to A C of S, G-2. Enemy saboteurs have been apprehended already in FRANCE, and it is known that the enemy has plans for an extensive sabotage program.

i. Divisions will establish and maintain road blocks at strategic points throughout the division area. Road blocks will be manned by military police personnel. The use of Gendarmes and FFI for this purpose is authorized when approved by the Civil Affairs Sections. All civilians passing through these blocks will be screened and suspicious persons will be held until released by A C of S, G-2. Similarly appropriate steps will be taken to prevent infiltration by means of secondary roads and trails.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

j. Third Army reports the capture of enemy agents, equipped with radios, dropped by parachute. In view of the possibility that the enemy will initiate similar tactics within the Corps zone, all commanders will be prepared to establish road blocks and send out motorized patrols to areas of reported drops as directed by this headquarters. Each Division and Corps unit will maintain a motorized alert unit for rapid movement to any point in its area.

k. A curfew for civilians will be enforced between the hours of 1800A to 0700A. Passes for civilians to circulate during the curfew hours will be issued by the Mayors after approval by Civil Affairs and CIC only to essential individuals such as doctors, police and town officials.

l. In general, civilians will be confined to the immediate commune in which they reside. The Gendarmes attached to CIC/SM Detachments, local police and recognized FFI members working under the jurisdiction of the CIC will be used to enforce these regulations. Issuance of all passes will be made in accordance with the security regulations promulgated by CIC and Civil Affairs and will be subject to supervision by these agencies.

m. Immediately after each population center is occupied, CIC/SM personnel, in conjunction with the Civil Affairs, will immediately inaugurate security measures including stopping of all communications (radio, mail, telephone, etc) and arresting any known enemy agents and other persons. Local authorities and police agencies will be instructed regarding control of civilian circulation, curfew, black-out, and cooperation with Allied authorities. In the region of ALSACE, all local authorities will be immediately subjected to the closest scrutiny by CIC/SM personnel and individuals found to be a security hazard will be removed immediately from their positions and placed under arrest for further investigation.

n. Military personnel will be on constant look-out for German soldiers dressed in civilian clothing. Isolated groups of enemy who have been by-passed will probably discard their uniforms to avoid detection and will attempt to make their way back to the REICH in groups of two or three.

3. All military personnel will be constantly alert to the importance of security, and will maintain the highest degree of security in discussions of planning operations, in non-secure transmissions, and in the handling of classified documents.

By command of Major General BROOKS:

/s/ Michael L. Connors
/t/ MICHAEL L. CONNORS,
Colonel, U. S. A.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Letter Hq Seventh Army
dated 15 Sept.

DISTRIBUTION:
"C"

Reproduced at Headquarters, 35th AAA Brigade, 24 January 1945.

R E S T R I C T E D

C O N F I D E N T I A L

licence rolls as the October commander of 108 Panzer Brigade is reported in charge of administrative affairs at brigade headquarters.

2. Einheit STIELAU

As mentioned above, this is a jeep-borne outfit divided into engineer, communications destruction, and radio groups. Each of these was in turn subdivided into approximately 10 four-man teams, one team to a jeep, making a total of 30 to 35 jeeps and 120 to 150 men.

The unit was apparently completely clothed in varied U. S. uniforms, including overcoats, field jackets, steel helmets, OD shirts, and GI shoes, plus a few small items of German equipment. In addition they carried German parachutists overalls, for use behind their own lines, and German pay-books and dog-tags.

Weapons seem to have been a mixed batch, including U.S., British and German. Likewise, rations were both U.S. and German. German hand grenades were carried, and presumably explosives, incendiary grenades, and other special weapons were provided for given tasks.

Various U.S. Army forms, including trip tickets and clothing authorizations were also carried. As a further means of identification PW were also briefed on the 5th U.S. Armored Division.

The STIELAU unit, which included the more expert linguists, was divided up equally among the three combat teams or battle groups to smooth their advance.

3. Battle Group 1 (Lt. Col. WULF)

No details are available. It is said to be slightly larger than Battle Group 2, but similar in composition.

4. Battle Group 2 (Capt. SCHERF)

HQ

Rcn Pl	- 3 x 6 wheeled German Rcn cars.
Sig. Pl	- 3 large, 5 small German vehicles.
Engr. Pl.	- 4 to 5 U.S. trucks with bridging equipment, mines, and/or explosives.
"Special Forces" (Sonderkommandos)	- allotted from <u>Einheit STIELAU</u> , reportedly 4 communications destroyer teams, 2 radio teams, 2 engr teams.
Bn BADING	- II Bn of Para Regt z.b.V. Tptd on U.S. trucks and most men in U.S. uniforms. 3 to 4 rifle coys, ea 3 pls
Einheit TAUBERICH	- Unknown quantity.
Einheit ERNST	- Apparently 2 Coy of 655 Ass Gun Bde, 15 Panthers (3 camouflaged as U.S. tank destroyers) 3 U.S. Sherman tanks
Einheit STEIN	- AA unit of SP 2 cm guns.
Supply Colns.	

5. Battle Group 3 (CS Lt. Col. PEIRER)

As in the case of Battle Group 1 stated to be similar to Battle Group 2 but larger. PWs ascribe this to the discrepancy in rank between two Lt. Cols. and the Capt., i.e., the Cols. could get whatever they asked for and the

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Capt came off third best. In actual fact it would seem that the posting of Lt. Cols. to two of the groups and only a Captain to the other would indicate that from the beginning Brigade HQ envisaged larger and more important units for Battle Groups 1 and 3.

Some recent PWs from Para Regiment z.b.V give the following incomplete information on Battle Group 3.

Einheit GRABOWSKI - 12 to 14 Armd troop carriers, mainly German, but with U.S. star on hood. 5 to 10 German Rcn cars.

Einheit KEMPE (KEMPE?) - A Para unit (part of Para Regt z.b.V?)

Engr Pl

Rcn Pl

"E-Zug"?

PWs claim that 1 and 3 were particularly stronger in tanks, and a fair guess is that they received the remaining companies of 655 Assault Gun Brigade which may well have included both tanks and assault guns.

E. Identifications and Pass Words

The difficult problem of identifying these men to other German soldiers, both while on the German side and after going through American lines was handled mainly by visual methods. A large number have been reported, but it is not known what order they were used in and how frequently they were changed. The following is believed to be a complete list of all those so far reported.

1. Wearing of pink or blue scarves.
2. Overcoat or field jacket unbuttoned or only partially buttoned
3. Use of flashlights with red or blue light (now reported superseded by a green light).
4. Roads chalked with arrows, houses with circles.
5. Tanks and vehicles marked with Q, H, Y or Z (now reported removed or covered with dirt).
6. A yellow ribbon below the first button of the shirt or overcoat.
7. Raising the left hand in answer to a raised right hand.
8. Tapping on the helmet.
9. Removing the helmet.
10. Wearing head bandages.

In addition to these, PWs claim that a special sign and counter-sign are to be introduced at a later stage of the campaign. This would presumably be done at the time when the "complete camouflage (Volltarnung)" order is given. At this time everybody is to put on U.S. helmet, overcoat shoes, and leggings.

(Note: While this second stage has not yet been confirmed from other PWs, large quantities of additional American uniforms have been reported).

F. Movement to Battle Area

1 Company, at least, of 655 Assault Gun Brigade left GRAFENWOHR about 1 December along with Battle Group SCHERT arriving at BRUHL (F 4148) north of BONN about 8 December. From there they moved to STEINBACH (RHEIN-BACH ? F 42) and to CEROMINT (?) (unlocated).

PWs from Einheit STEILAU claim the main part of the brigade moved to MUNSTEREINEL on 5 or 6 December, and that the STEILAU group followed later, leaving GRAFENWOHR 8 December, arriving at MUNSTEREINEL the night of 12/13 December. On 14 and 15 December after receiving more papers and uniforms they set out by jeep to HALLSCHLAG (L09) and SPADIKYLL (I19).

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G. The Plan

Most of the units represented so far seem to have a connection with 1 SS Panzer Division, spearheading the northern drive. Jumping off from the general vicinity of HALLSCHLAG and STADIKYLL the STIELAU units of the Brigade were to advance in their jeeps, infiltrate through our lines and execute two main missions. The first was a fairly deep penetration into our lines after which they would interfere with communications, destroy message centres and radio stations, and in general cause as much confusion as possible. They were then to continue to the MEUSE and to report by radio the conditions of the bridges and the roads leading to them.

The second mission was one of close cooperation with the tanks, assault guns, and other vehicles. The STIELAU jeeps, driving ahead, would report a German break-through, and shortly behind them 150 Panzer Brigade's American tanks would appear in full retreat, pursued by the German tanks of the Brigade. The regular tanks and Panzergrenadiers, presumably of 1 SS Panzer Division would then take advantage of the resulting panic and move in after the brigade. The plan assumed that during the now doubly-confused break-through the unit would have enough strength to fight for and hold certain vital points. Thus 1 Company of 655 Assault Gun Brigade was to advance through MALMEDY and take and hold a bridge on the MAAS, although the PW who reported this mission was under the impression that the MAAS ran through MALMEDY. II Battalion of Para Regiment z.b.V. was to seize and hold a bridge at LIEGE for one or two days until relieved by SS armour.

Typical of the individual missions of small groups was one in which a jeep party was to occupy a vital crossroads and block it with demolitions and obstacles. Another group had the task of approaching a U.S. battery on foot, talking to the gun crews and obtaining all possible information about their dispositions and mission.

H. Success and Failure

How well the plan succeeded will probably never be known; as is frequently the case with PW interrogation, it is the ones who failed who have provided the information. At least one column at STAVELOT was badly disrupted by artillery fire and/or bombing, but this was undoubtedly after a considerable advance had been made. One STIELAU group jeep lasted a half-hour after crossing the lines when its occupants were picked up for not knowing the pass-word. The group who attempted to interrogate the artillerymen were promptly taken in. The large number of personnel involved (estimated between 1,000 and 2,500) as opposed to the small groups captured so far are an obvious indication of how strong a danger still exists. One of the most important features is that the various groups are capable of and apparently plan to change from German to American uniforms and back again as the situation demands.

J. Other Saboteurs and Subversives

There have been individual reports of American-equipped parachutists being dropped behind the lines, but apparently on a very much smaller scale than 150 Panzer Brigade's activities. There is, however, no indication that they are officially connected with von der HEYDT's group which have operated as normal parachutists. It is possible, however, that the U. S. clothed groups may be drawn from the Para Regiment z.b.V. of the Panzer Brigade.

Another mission whose connection with 150 Panzer Brigade and "Operation GREIF" has not been cleared is the reported infiltration of a small group deep into the rear areas for the purpose of assassinating higher Allied Commanders.

A group of 50 - 80 men, whose leaders have been given as a Capt von BEHR, a Lt. SCHWARTZ, a 2nd Lt. LOCHNER, and just possibly SKORZENY himself, were to infiltrate through our lines by 19 December and travel by road to Paris. There they would rendezvous in the Cafe de la Paix, receive the latest information from their agents, join up with previously dropped parachutists, and proceed to carry out an assassination of various higher officers at SHAEF. During the trip through FRANCE the group will pose as a PW escort unit, and some of the men will be dressed in German officers' uniforms.

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The group was said to be dressed in British as well as American uniforms. Other headquarters were also to be attacked.

II. BRIEF FOR SPY

(Source: First Canadian Army)

The following captured document is apparently an official directive for German spies operating behind Allied lines in HOLLAND. The list is lengthy and elaborate, but is not meant to be by any means exhaustive, as the concluding paragraphs show.

Instructions in the event of a military occupation of the NETHERLANDS by enemy forces.

A. Military information

Of interest are all military movements, measures, strengths, armament, nationality of military units in so far as they are of strategical importance and provide an opportunity for counter measures.

In this connection the following information is of interest:-

1. Location of enemy units.
2. Location of important Hqs (down to divisional Hq).
3. Classification of enemy units with regard to their nationality.
4. Total strength of enemy detachments, relative strengths of various army units, and names of the commanders.
5. Which are the main supply-harbours and what are the main trans-shipping points.
6. The main transport roads.
7. Known and unknown airfields.
8. Calling to the colours of able-bodied men and age groups.

B. Political Information

Of interest are all measures and their consequences concerning political and public life in the general and the administrative sense.

1. Which military or civil authorities exercise the legislative power. Who is their chief?
2. Which ministries, departments and authorities etc have been replaced by military government.
3. Which ministries, departments and authorities etc work independently.
4. Which members of the Dutch exiled government are already in the country and who wield power in the forming of a new government.
5. Political activity of members of the (Dutch) Royal Family in combination with the occupying forces.
6. Political measures by the occupying forces, eg, against the NSB and the German-mined people, the influence of the Jews, regulations in connection with broadcasting, the press etc.
7. Resistance groups and subversive activities against the enemy occupation.

C. Information Concerning Commerce and Industry

We are chiefly interested in reports, indicating the measures taken by the enemy to make use of industrial resources for military purposes, eg.

1. In which industries war material is made: kind and extent of the production.
2. Are there any plans to change this?
3. Which important power stations (gas and electricity) are used for military purposes.
4. The main traffic roads and supply bases in use for arms production.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

These instructions can only be a guide, to show what information is actually wanted and what is the purpose of the information. Consequently the informant is completely free to make reports of any sort, provided they contain valuable information. The reports should be kept as short as possible. (telegraphese).

By command of Brigadier General TOWNSEND:

W. V. LUNN
Colonel, CAC
Executive

OFFICIAL:

Edward C. Trimble
EDWARD C. TRIMBLE,
Major, C.A.C.,
S-2.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
35th AAA Brigade
A.P.O. 758

22 January 1945

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

NUMBER.....1

GERMAN USE OF AMERICAN UNIFORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPIES.

I. IRREGULAR ENEMY METHODS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

A. Introduction

The following account from SHAEF Int Notes No. 42 gives an excellent picture of the enemy's use on a large scale of Allied uniforms and equipment in the recent counter offensive.

B. Total War - Nazi Style

"Yes, the war in the East is elemental but here in the West, against the English and the Americans, we are fighting a gentlemen's war, a professional soldier's war."

This has been the gist of innumerable PW statements since D-Day. Whatever small thread of truth there may have been in this has disappeared in the current German counter-offensive. 120 American prisoners were massacred on 17 December by an SS unit: PWs from other SS units have told of specific instructions by responsible officers that they were not to take any prisoners. Finally, there is the use, by regular German Army soldiers, of U.S. uniforms and equipment as part of a plan known and approved by higher German commanders.

The operatives of the plan seem to fall into two categories:

1. Small groups of agents parachuted behind the lines or infiltrating through them to carry out assassination attempts against higher commanders and to perform individual sabotage missions fairly far behind the lines.
2. Members of 150 Panzer Brigade operating in both U.S. and German equipment and uniforms with the mission of spearheading the German combat units by spreading panic and confusion in and immediately behind American front line units and of seizing bridges and communications centres further back.

The training, composition, and employment of both these groups are discussed in detail below:

C. Preparation

The capture, about four weeks ago, of the order calling for the formation of an English-speaking unit, gave an indication of what was to come. It said, "The Fuhrer has ordered the formation of a special unit of a strength of about two battalions for employment on reconnaissance and special tasks on the Western Front. The personnel will be assembled from volunteers of all arms of the Army and the Waffen SS." The document then mentioned the control of these personnel by SKORZENY at ORANIENBURG, the necessity for a knowledge of the "English language and American dialect," and the importance of turning in captured clothing, equipment, weapons, and vehicles. The volunteers for this unit were to report to FRIEDENTHAL, near ORANIENBURG, by 31 October.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

In exactly what terms this request was passed on to the troops is not known, but some partially repentant PWs have given the following account of their transition from reasonably respectable soldiers to subversive ones.

Of these PWs, characterized by First U.S. Army interrogators as "a soldier, a sailor, and a GAF man, prepared to pay the price" two claim that their recruitment came in early November. Men from all the Armed Forces who were known to speak English, preferably with an American accent, were "commanded" to Stab SOLAR by their superior officers. That these men were actually forced into the undertaking is not yet clear, for the third of the three claims he "volunteered for a mission where linguistic knowledges were desired."

As directed in the initial document, two of the men reported to FRIEDENTHAL where one was given an examination in English by A GAF, an SS, and a Naval officer. Having passed the exam he was sent to the U.S. prisoner camps in KUSTRIN and LIMBURG to refresh his "American dialect". Prior to the exam he, with 20 to 30 other officers and men had been told that he would be sent to an interpreters' school if he passed. The second PW, whose English seems to have been less dubious, went directly to the refresher course at the PW camps, and the third, who was being considered only as a driver, went directly to the training grounds at GRAFENWOHR.

At GRAFENWOHR the outline of the subversive group began to take shape. First there were about 150 accomplished linguists who were formed into an Einheit STIELAU, commanded by an Oberleutnant STIELAU. Those men were trained in GRAFENWOHR until 15 November, when they moved to nearby VILSECK until 6 or 7 December.

Formed first into linguistic groups according to their abilities, they were later formed into an engineer group, a communications destruction group, and a radio group, which were subdivided into jeep squads of 4 men, with varying proportions of officers and EM/ORS in each squad. At the beginning of December the actual jeeps, weapons, and uniforms appeared. If they had not known before what their mission was they could no longer mistake it. To PWs knowledge no one protested.

Training consisted of U. S. Army organisation, identification, close order drill, and various linguistic exercises, in addition to their actual tactical training.

There is only fragmentary information so far on the units of 150 Panzer Brigade other than Einheit STIELAU. A parachute unit known variously as HERMANN GOERING Parachute Regiment z.b.V., Parachute Regiment z.b.V. "13 FEB Fallschirmjaeger" (code name) and 12 Parachute Regiment z.b.V. was reportedly an expansion of a Parachute Battalion z.b.V BADING which is now the II Battalion. PWs claim that the BADING unit had seen "special service" in FRANCE, but was pulled back into Germany after the invasion. Where the personnel for the other one or two battalions came from is unknown, as is the case with the men forming the AA, engineer, signal, and other elements of the actual combat teams, though it seems doubtful that they were all volunteers responding to the initial SKORZENY call.

Apparently the rest of the Brigade had received their American equipment early in November, and by the middle of November the brigade, including at least part of Einheit STIELAU, was conducting exercises as the three battle groups or combat teams. Training consisted of night marches, including the various identification procedures and the panic-faking (Durchschleusen) which was to become part of the mission later on.

D. Organisation and Equipment



Some details are missing, but the outline is clear:

1. Brigade Headquarters

The brigade is reported commanded by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer (Lt. Col) SKORZENY himself, and he and his headquarters go by the code name of SOLAR. On the other hand, a repentant and knowledgeable officer PW claims that although the code name SOLAR is correct the commander is an unknown "black-listed" officer whom he has never seen. A Lt. Col. MUSCULUS, who is on Allied intel-

(81)

29 Jan 45



Overlay Showing
AT Defence.
Scale 1/25000.
Official Hoover
May 5-3



S E C R E T

ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT NO. 139.

(Source: G-2 Report, 103 Inf Div, dated 23 Jan 1945)

EXCERPTS FROM THE FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATION OF
SS STANDARTENFUEHRER (COL) HANS LINGNER,
CO, 17 SS PZ GREN DIV

LINGNER, Hans, SS STANDARTENFUEHRER (Col), Commander of 17 SS Pz Gren Div "GOETZ von BERLICHINGEN", and a General Staff Officer. A 29-year old arrogant product of Nazism who at first refused to talk to anybody with rank less than Colonel, and even then refused to reveal any information of a military nature. He changed.

Source emphasized the fact that he had served mainly in the field and that he was not very familiar with the organization of higher units, personalities, or German Army policies. The information that follows was given quite freely and the interrogating officer believes that LINGNER has told, substantially, the truth, as far as he has gone.

1. ALSACE OFFENSIVE:

According to source, the German Army is unable to carry on simultaneously two offensives in the WEST. Although he admits that the German divs involved in the ARDENNES offensive lost heavily, he points out that they can be re-equipped and reinforced by men coming from replacement depots. This group of 20-25 divs can then be kept ready either to meet a large-scale Allied attack on the RUHR, or it can be sent to another area for another main attack. PW thinks that the latter is more probable this winter, due to the fact that Allied air superiority cannot be used fully at this time of year. He also remarks that the German railroad net is still fully capable of coping with a mass movement of this character.

The New Year's Eve German offensive on the Southern Front is explained as follows:

When the breakthrough in Belgium was stopped by the Allies and the German High Command became aware that several Allied divs had been sent in from other fronts, orders were issued to attack with limited objectives along the entire front. A battle of annihilation (VERNICH-TUNGSSCHLACHT), he claims, would result in a German collapse. The German Command miscalculated Allied strength in Alsace and Lorraine and was probably surprised by the number of divs still remaining in this sector. Nevertheless, he reasons, attack is still the best defensive weapon and the only way for Germany to gain time.

As an example of German intentions he cites the instance of the attack carried out by his own div. He was only ordered to reduce the distance between his and the Allied MLR. He advanced about 3 km, thus bringing both lines only 500 meters apart. To accomplish this mission he received slightly more ammunition than his normal requirements called for; gasoline allotment remained about the same as usual. On the intelligence side, he was informed that 2 French Armored Div was kept almost entirely in reserve in order to counter-attack in the event of a breakthrough.

2. CRITICISM OF ALLIED TACTICS

PW made the following observations, based on his experiences and on the results of his personal interrogation of American PW, of American tactics on his div front: The American infantryman is as courageous as the German soldier. With more experienced leadership all German attacks emanating from his div sector would have been beaten back.

a. Patrols:

(1) American short-range reconnaissance (GEFECHTSAUFKLAERUNG) is not sufficiently thorough. Through lack of aggressiveness the patrols do not succeed often enough in drawing fire which would reveal the location of heavy German inf weapons.

(2) The missions entrusted to American patrols are much too complicated. It is impossible for any patrol to bring back all the information requested of it. It would be much better to send out more smaller-sized patrols with more modest missions.

b. Terrain Intelligence: American unit commanders do not study carefully enough the terrain opposite their front. This accounts for the fact that American heavy inf weapons are not always concentrated at the point where the German main effort in the attack (SCHWERPUNKT) is normally to be expected.

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c. Defense in Depth: PW states that our small units are echeloned in depth excellently. The same cannot be said of our divs. The div reserves are spread out too much, and in rows, instead of being concentrated to most tactical requirements.

d. Reserves: PW always took advantage of the fact that our bn and regtl commanders insist upon keeping their reserves with them, instead of dispatching them to an adjoining sector which is endangered. It was source's impression that our unit commanders, in order to retain their reserves, pretend that a German attack is about to take place, or deliberately send their reserves forward to meet a small attack so that they do not have to part with them for a longer period. Aware of this, PW invariably began his offensives with a fake attack, with a large amount of small arms fire. When the American forward unit commander of this sector sent for reserves and they were forthcoming, source began his main attack at a point where it should have been expected by the American command from the nature of the terrain, etc. Precious time was thereby lost by the Americans in gathering reserves to counter-attack successfully.

e. Tactical Employment of Allied Tanks: The reasons behind our employment of medium tanks in groups of two and three is not clear to source. In his opinion the Sherman tank was not conceived as a gun carrier in direct support of the inf. They should be used in company strength to achieve a general breakthrough, considering the large number of tanks we have at our disposal. Only the shortage of armor causes the Germans to use their tanks in small numbers.

f. American Garrison at RIMLING: PW paid tribute to the gallantry of the two American Cos which were captured in RIMLING (6555) 2-3 Jan 45. In spite of the fact that these men were in a situation that was almost desperate, the commander rejected PW's ultimatum to surrender and replied that he would fight on to the last shot. The village was taken by the Germans two days later after they faked a frontal attack from the NORTH and attacked from the SOUTH. The German troops sustained heavy losses. PW could not understand why the two Cos were not reinforced or pulled back on the road RIMLING-BETTWEILER, which was never under German control. PW did not see the remnants of the American garrison because he was himself captured the same day, while out well forward on a personal reconnaissance mission.

3. MINE FIELDS: When PW's 17 SS Pz Gren Div attacked on 2-3 Jan 45, three American mine fields were discovered, two SW of the village of ERCHINGEN, and one W of RIMLING. An estimated 10,000 new American AT mines had been spread over the ground by our troops before a snowfall. Unfortunately, a strong wind arose and uncovered all the mines, with the exception of a few rows which had trip wires. PW ordered the mines to be dug into the ground. A hundred of his engineers accomplished this task in one night. Three of PW's assault guns had their tracks damaged by mines which were scattered in the area between the village of RIMLING and mine field D.

4. ARMOR AND ASSAULT WEAPONS IN 17 SS PZ GREN DIV

a. Assault Gun Bn: Before his capture on 2-3 Jan 45, there were in 17 SS Div 22 - 75 mm assault guns, five of which were non-operational. He launched his attack with 12, losing three near the village of ACHEN. Three others had been damaged, but were recovered. Each of the three Cos had a command tank.

b. Recon Bn: This Bn had only 8 - 8-wheeled and 6 - 4-wheeled recon cars. One Co was equipped with motorcycles. The entire Recon Bn was kept in reserve during the attack.

c. 353 Flamethrower Tank Co: This attached Co had only 8-10 tanks operational when the attack started. Six of them were knocked out near the village of GROSREDERCHING. PW attributed this to the cowardice of the crews.

d. Heavy Tank Bn: At first PW claimed that this Bn never showed up in time for the attack, but later admitted that on 28 Dec 44 four Tiger tanks appeared in his area. One of them broke down; the other three were kept in readiness to meet an expected American counter-attack. Source stated that this was a GHQ unit which did not come under his control. It acted completely independently.

(Seventh Army)

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
 APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
 Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
 Initials: E.L.S.
 Date: 25 Jan 45
 From: 241800A Jan 45
 To : 251800A Jan 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #139

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

Ey continued his hvy prèssure on center of Corps front but his main effort appeared to be in the woods W of SCHWEIGHAUSEN (R0024). Ey offensive has been contained there and in SCHILLERSDORF (Q8430).

SE of HAGUENAU ey was withdrawing under pressure. PW from 2 Co, 192 PGR, captured vic R103184, indicates 21 PZ Div is now on Corps E flank and 10 SS Div has side slipped to NW where 21 SS PGR was identified by approx 80 PWs taken vic R0622.

There was little ey activity on Corps left flank. Mortars in the Q8238/sq harassed the 36th Engrs during the afternoon. Ey defended his gains of the morning stubbornly and continued to hold SCHILLERSDORF (Q8530) in bitter house to house fighting. Resistance was also stubborn W of MULHAUSEN (Q8631) and vic Q860315. MG fire was received from houses in NIEFFERN (Q874300) until the town was destroyed house by house by 8" Hows. KINDWILLER (Q9029) was occupied by ey late in the afternoon.

In 79 Div's zone ey was pushed back across the river after suffering hvy casualties and leaving 100 PWs. The last hold of 10 SS Div on our side of river vic R065230 was captured late this afternoon. Ey forces in SCHWEIGHAUSEN (R0024) and BOIS D'OHLUNGEN (Q9724) resisted heavily, but our troops made progress in town and in the woods with half of SCHWEIGHAUSEN reported in our hands. Ey is dug in on N bank of river from CAMP DE OBERHOFFEN to OBERHOFFEN (R0820). Corps right flank was quiet.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. It might be assumed that ey attacks to cross the MODER River on a wide front during this period would cause a considerable increase in ey arty activity, but shellreps indicate only a moderate increase in the attack area - the sectors of the 79th and 103d Divs. In fact, the shelling was about evenly divided among the left three division sectors, with the 36th, especially in the daytime, drawing much less than usual. The heaviest concentration reported consisted of 50 rds, but most of the others varied between 10-20 rds. Night harassment rose slightly as towns and positions in the forward area, including RICHTENBERG, ROTH-BACH, KURTZENHAUSEN, WEITBRUCH, BISCHWILLER, HAGUENAU, INGWILLER, GRIES, and DAUEN-DORF (Q9326) were all hit. In the morning the WILDENGUTH-REIPERTSWILLER area was the main attraction, and it was here that 50 rds fell at 1025A. About noon and in the afternoon SCHWEIGHAUSEN received a succession of small concentrations. ING-WILLER drew 88mm and 170mm interdiction fire during the day, and likewise the HAGUENAU area, besides other caliber fire, felt the weight of heavies. Shellreps indicate that 17cm guns are now operating apparently in the DAMBACH and LEMBACH valleys.

With the identification of elements of the 6th SS Mountain Div in SCHILLERS-DORF (Q8430) the possibility arises that the long column picked up on the PHILLIPS-BOURG-WINDSTEIN road two days and heavily shelled by the Corps Arty was the movement of units of this division into their new sector. The column was reported as consisting of both horses and motor vehicles, and with the decrease in arty activity in the 45th sector it is quite probable that some of the 6 Div arty was included in this column. As yet the ey attacks in the 103d sector have not been strongly supported by arty, and it is possible that destruction of prime movers and horses by our fire has resulted in partial failure to bring up their guns thus explaining the lack of support. New position areas, based on active gun locations obtained so far, are shaping up around ESCHBACH, MERTZWILLER, and the ENGWILLER-ZINSWILLER region.

Shellrep total - 71

79 Div 45 Div 103 Div 36 Div 6 Gp 405 Gp 2 FOB 33 Brig
 24 16 8 3 4 2 11 3

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b. Changes to EB List #22

(1) Additions:

CONC NO	COORDINATES	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYPE
8238 NB	8242-3835	A	2 FOB-S	1/88
8533 MZ	8576-3844	A	2 FOB-S	1/-
8835 NC	8872-3550	A	2 FOB-S	1/-
8932 MY	8990-3243	B	2 FOB-S	1-6/-
9133 NA	9100-3810	B	2 FOB-S	1-2/-
9629 ND	9649-2907	B	69 AOP	2/-
9831 NE	9862-3106	B	69 ACP	3/-
9930 MX	9942-3030	B	2 FOB-S	2/-
1010 MV	1005-1050	B	36 AOP	4/-
1318 MU	1350-1815	B	33 GOP	4/-
1323 MW	1303-2304	B	36 GOP	4/-

(2) Deletions:

1911 MF 2114 UV 2121 SI

(3) Suspect List #22-3 (Locations of doubtful activity and those requiring additional confirmation or a more accurate location):

9044-2925	1/-	2 FOB-S
822 - 380	-/-	36 E
8252-3723	2/-	2 FOB-S
8786-3485	3/Med?	2 FOB-S
9200-3352	1/-	2 FOB-S
8935-2880	1/-	2 FOB-S
938 - 318	2/Med?	977 GOP

15 sound locations were made, all in the western sector. B sound did not pick up any batteries probably due to extremely reduced shelling coming from the area under their surveillance. Of the locations received, 6 were new (with two locations of MY), 5 were included in the SL, two were those of very close-in SPs, while one was a confirmation of 8242 LA.

No flash locations were made.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. Poor visibility throughout the period limited firing by arty with the Corps generally to unobserved harassing, counterbattery and supporting fire. However, forward observers with the infantry were able to adjust on numerous close-in targets, especially in the 79 Wnf Div and 103 Inf Div sectors where heavy fighting took place through the day. AOP operation was practically denied by low hanging clouds and heavy ground haze.

During the early morning hours, at the request of 3 DIA, which was being attacked from the N, 36 Inf Div Arty and Corps Arty fired in the CAMBSHEIM (R1110) area on a number of locations reported to be ey assembly areas and approach routes. The French successfully repulsed the attack.

Close support missions were fired for 103 Inf Div in the MUHCHAUSEN (Q8631) - SCHILLERSDORF (Q8430) - NIEFFERN (Q8729) area during the day. At the request of the inf in MUHLHAUSEN, 8th How fire was brought down on the town.

103 Div Arty fired a TOT at 1040A. 4 RPG from 105mm Bns and 2 RPG from the 155mm Bn were dropped on ey personnel, est at Bn strength, forming for attack at Q875302. Observers reported the concentration right on the area. The expected attack never developed.

383 FA Bn FO adjusted 995 FA Bn on a bridge at Q872298 in the town of NIEFFERN. 26 rds were expended. The bridge was destroyed and 7 houses in the vic were either destroyed or badly damaged. The inf later reported this materially helped their attack in that sector.

634 FA Bn fired on a 2/G btry at Q96492907. 59 AFA Bn AOP made the adjustment. 21 rds HE and 1 rd WP were used, with 2 direct hits reported by the observer.

59 AFA Bn AOP also adjusted 634 FA Bn on a 3/G btry at Q98623106. 25 rds HE and 2 rds WP were expended. The observer was unable to remain for fire for effect because he had to return for gas.

At 1640A, 634 FA Bn was adjusted on a tank at Q98002602 by 904 FA Bn FO. 2 RAs HE and 2 rds WP were fired to make this the most economic adjustment of the day. The observer reported the tank was left burning.

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142 Inf FO fired 194 FA Bn on a house at R09702005. After 24 rds were shot the observer reported the bldg damaged. A number of fires were started in the area.

194 FA Bn AOP fired 38 rds from 194 FA Bn on an ey btry at R116224. The mission was reported to be very effective with rds landing close to the gun positions.

A factory at R06502295, containing ey personnel, was partially destroyed by 698 FA Bn. 242 FA Bn FO made the adjustment and reported 12 hits on the bldg.

5 tanks were stopped at Q88982903 by lt cal arty fire. The 103 Inf Div Arty FO who made the adjustment called for a TOT from med and hvy supporting arty. 405 FA Gp responded with a TOT at 1843A. The FO reported the concentration "right on the nose". All five of the tanks were damaged and disabled.

Flash OP 2, Btry A, 2 FA Obsn Bn displaced to Q82752699. Btry B occupied a new sound outpost, OP #, at R009223.

b. Summary of Missions Fired:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		45 IDA		79 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			7	2		2	3			3
Per	6		15		11		37	9	31	22
Veh	3		3				5	3	4	4
MG & Mor					2		2	2	8	
Prep								8		
Armor			4				5	5	1	2
Def Fire	4		13	12			7	31	8	12
Har		13		19		28	5	42		53
Reg	6		10		11		9		5	
Misc	2	7	4	19			2	63	1	
Prop		2						4		5
TOTAL	21	22	56	52	22	32	75	167	58	101

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp		33 Brig	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2	8		14		9	1	2
Per		8		4		17	1	1
Veh		3				1		2
Armor	1	1				1		
Def Fire								12
Har		51		12		12		7
Reg	2		1					
Misc		14				11		
Dest			1				1	
TOTAL	5	85	2	30		51	3	24

AOP Missions - 3

SECTION IV. MISCELLANEOUS

Forward elements of the Corps are reported at the following points:

Q794374; Q810370; Q823370; Q840350; Q830340; Q864314; Q904270; Q945272; Q975259; Q975254; Q990250; Q995245; R005245; R030245; R050231; R064232; R090200; R096183; R084151; R060125; R035110.

Schroeder

SCHROEDER
 Asst S-3

S E C R E T

File

S-3 REPORT

107
27 Jan 45

NO: 205
MAPS: 1
25000

FROM: 0001 27 JAN 45
TO: 2400 27 JAN 45
PLACE: VIC WEITBRUCH
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE:
2200 27 JAN 45

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

NO CHANGE

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

NO CHANGE

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

242 INF ON L. 142 INF ON RT. Co B 304 ENGR DIS.
CB C 304 MED BN. ATCHD 904 FA BN DIS REINF
B 594 FA BN + TWO BTRYS 312 FA BN, Co A
47 TR BN ATCHD Co A 813 TD BN SUPPT. BTRY
4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: B 353 AA BN(-) SUPPT.
COLD - SNOW - CLOUDY

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:

UNIT CONTINUED MISSION OF DEFENDING
IN SECTOR. TWO SNIPERS REPORTED IN
OBERHOFFEN FIRING INTO 3RD BN SECTOR.
PATROL FROM 3RD BN FOUND NO ENEMY
ATTEMPT TO BUILD BRIDGE OVER
MODER RIVER. HARASSING MORTAR
+ ARTY FIRE RECEIVED IN SECTOR
DURING PERIOD. CONSIDERABLE ENEMY
MOTOR ACTIVITY HEARD ON ROAD LEADING INTO
CAMP OBERHOFFEN. ARTY FIRED ON
CAMP.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

EXCELLENT

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

SEE 11-5 + OVERLAY

Martin
Capt ASST S-3

File

94
26 Jan. 45

S-3 REPORT

204
1
25000
NO:
MAPS:

0001 26 JAN 45
2400 26 JAN 45
FROM WEITBRUCH
TO:
2200: 26 JAN 45
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE

SEE OVERLAY

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

SEE OVERLAY

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

242 INF ON L., 142 INF ON RT. Co B 304 ENGR DIS.
Co C 304 MED BN ATCHD. 311 FA BN DIS REINF
BY 59 FA BN + TWO BTRYS 312 FA BN. Co C 25
TK BN (-) ATCHD. Co C 813 TD BN (-) IN SUPPT. BTRY
B 353 AA BN (-) SUPPT.

CLOUDY - COLD - SNOW

3. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

UNIT REM. DEF. POSN DURING PERIOD. VERY LITTLE
ACTIVITY IN SECTOR. MOVEMENT OF VEH.
GOING NE FROM OBERHOFFEN REPORTED
BY I&R - ALSO VEH MOVEMENT COMING
TOWARD OBERHOFFEN. ARTY PLACED ON
MOVEMENTS. HARASSING ARTY FIRE
FELL IN SECTOR DURING PERIOD.
USE OF AA SEARCH LIGHTS LAST NIGHT
PROVED OF LITTLE VALUE. PLAN ARRANGED
TO ATTEMPT USE OF THEM AGAIN

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

TO NIGHT.

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

EXCELLENT

SEE IP 54 OVERLAY

Martin
Capt Asst S-3

SECRET

FIGHTER OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

28 January 1945.

1. A Co. 3 guns vic 038193 B Co. No change.
 3 guns vic KALPENHOFER (072214)
 3 guns vic MARIENTHAL (060198) (Reserve)
 C Co. 4 guns in HAGUEAU (040240)
 2 guns at 030237
 2 guns at 030230 (mobile reserve and roving)

2. A Co. CP in WEITERBUCH (vic 315th)
 B Co. CP in BATHENDORF
 C Co. CP in WIEDERSCHASPFOLSHEIM

3. "A" Co. returns to support 315th sector; "B" Co. to 314th sector (2 guns only operational, but will be reinforced); "C" Co. to 313th sector.

4. The TD support for this division, for the present, consists of 12 M-10s and 7 M-18s. Normal battalion strength is 36 guns. Replacements of both guns and crew members have been virtually impossible to obtain. We are doing our best to prevent enemy armor from breaking through our lines or shooting up our infantry. The tank destroyers are the major tank defense of the division. No one enjoys more than the tank destroyers knocking out tanks, self-propelled guns, trucks, machine gun nests or any other thing that belongs to Jerry. However, when we are so low in equipment, is it worthwhile to risk a gun in an exposed position for the sake of getting a target that could easily be engaged by other arms. Just remember that Jerry has guns too, and nothing would suit him better than to knock out one of these destroyers. When sufficient time is allowed for reconnaissance, concealed positions can often be found to accomplish the mission without needlessly exposing the gun to enemy fire. Our boys are always glad to cooperate with the infantry to accomplish these missions. However, let us not expose these guns needlessly to enemy fire when the target is one that can be taken on by other arms. Our primary job is knocking out enemy armor, but if we lose our guns by firing at less worthwhile targets, the doughboy will one day face the unpleasant job of stopping tanks without tank destroyer support.

-MC CUTCHEEN-
 Major, Commanding.

-PARKIN-
 Capt, S-3.

SECRET

315" *Blue* *43* *28 Jan 45*
SECRET
FIGHTER OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

27 January 1945.

1. Battalion dispositions no change.

2. Of Interest To All - Know Your Supporting Weapons.

M-18 TANK DESTROYER

(1) **ARMAMENT** - 76mm gun, 50 cal. AA MG. This gun has approximately the same armor-piercing capabilities as the 3" gun which gives the same amount of fire power.

(2) **MOTOR CARRIAGE** - High power, light construction.

a. This tank destroyer is powered by a 500hp airplane engine which enables it to attain 65 mph in suitable terrain.

b. This destroyer has a torsion bar suspension system and drive sprockets of light construction subject to break upon contact with the lightest object.

c. Its steel tracks cause it to slide on icy roads more than other type vehicles.

d. Because of its light weight (20-tons) and great power it is highly maneuverable in suitable terrain (other than ice and mud).

(3) **ARMOR** - The armor of an M-18 is quite light, varying from 10 to 20 mm. The armor plate thickness is about the same as the light armored car, M-8, used by Cav and Ren units, which makes it vulnerable to all fires other than small arms.

(4) **CAPABILITIES** -

a. The M-18 can move from one position to another very rapidly.

b. It can destroy enemy armor: Mk IV at 1200-1500 yds; Mk V at 400-700 yds (except frontally); Mk VI at 400-700 yds (except frontally).

c. The M-18 can provide direct fire support in the assault gun role but is not suited for such because of its light armor. The M-10 is more suited to this role.

(5) **LIMITATIONS** -

a. Because of its light armor this destroyer must maneuver to get out from under enemy arty and mortar fire. It cannot sit in position under such fire and take the beating the M-10 will take ~~without being hit~~.

b. Because of its light construction, it is easily damaged by trees, buildings and such obstacles.

c. Its employment is more difficult as it must be employed by movement from cover positions to fire positions. It cannot live and sit in front line positions under enemy fire.

3. The 2 M-10s in SCHWEIGHAUSEN will eventually move over to the new Div sector. A re-adjustment will be made of TD dispositions within the new boundaries. The present deleted strength of M-10s and M-18s will necessitate careful study to get the necessary fire power over front lines. The policy of keeping under cover until a target is seen, and then moving out to meet the threat, will be in effect.

4. The 807th T.D. Bn. will be supporting the 101st Airborne Div on our left with 36 Towed 3" guns. The 636th T.D. Bn. (SP) remains on our right flank.

-MC CUTCHELL-
Major, Commanding.

-PARKIN-
Capt, S-3.

SECRET

msg
pl
46
28 Jan 45
(4)
CONFIDENTIAL

315th Dnf
S-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 241800 Jan 45
To : 251800 Jan 45
242D INF -029175
25 January 1945

No. 16.

Maps: Haguenau-Brumath - 1/50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy Front Lines - 065229-065239-069232-070227-074223-081214.
- b. Units in Contact - 7th Co 22nd Pz Gr Regt., 10th, 11th Co 21st Pz Gr Regt.
- c. Forces Capable of Intervention - Elements yet unidentified of the 10th SS Pz Division.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary - At 2235 Regt '1 OP reported heavy vehicle traffic to the NE about 2 miles away along roads on the opposite side of the Moder River. At 2240 3rd Bn OPs report a massing of vehicles at 064238. The Arty fired TOT on this area, and for a half hour after the sounds of the vehicles ceased. The enemy vehicles were heard again at 2310. At 2450 2nd Bn reported heavy amount of small arms fire on their left. At 2452 heavy enemy small arms, mortar and Arty fire was coming in on the positions of the 3rd Bn with the bulk of it placed in K Co's sector and on the left of E Co. This fire continued for a period of two and one-half hour. At 0230, 3rd Bn reported enemy in mill 065229. At 0430 3rd Bn reported a break through in K Co area. Fifteen minutes later another penetration was reported in between I and K Co. At 0545 two tanks were reported at the mill supporting enemy attack by fire. At 0635, two tanks were reported at 065239. As soon as it was light enough to see, the enemy started to surrender in groups. Some were pocketed - others voluntary - some from fear of the intense Arty fire. At 1030 three tanks were halted at pt 082214. The arty adjusted and rds fell among the tanks. They quickly moved out of vision. At 1230 about 40 prisoners were on the way back to the IPW cage. At 1515 2nd Bn reported enemy running between pt 062228 to pt 065229. The heavy arty was chasing them from the house to the mill and back again. At 1558 one enemy tank at 081215, plus two vans loaded with troops. Arty was placed in area. The enemy was observed at 1615 fleeing the mill pt 065229 in large numbers after a concentration of Arty. At the same time L Co captured an estimated 40 more prisoners and reported many enemy dead on the ground. The enemy at the end of the period still held the mill with one or possibly two tanks and some infantry. The enemy was driven back across the river at all points and the MLR is intact except for that one position.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. PW captured - 115. Total to date: 177.
- b. Some prisoners were captured in the airfield behind our line.
- c. Information from PWs: One officer leading 10th and 11th Co's - a Lt. En CP at ANNONCIADOS Fine briefed for attack at 241900. There. Attack at 250100 was broken up by our Arty. Five Co's reformed in woods opposite our positions and tried again. T/Sgt (PW) states as many MG casualties as from Arty. His group first encountered SA fire 300 meters on W side of Moder River, then he met terrific MG fire. Before crossing they received Arty and mortars. PW stated that outside of wounded at aid station and a few stragglers the remainder of the Co is here as prisoners. PW's were told 3 days ago that HAGUENAU was in German hands. PW stated that his En Cmdr stated that if first attack was not successful - the second would. PW stated members of the division had not completed training. They crossed Moder River in assault boats - no bridge across river - two Tiger tanks are in vicinity. PW stated that the objective was the road on the high ground along our MLR and at that point they were to be leap-frogged by another unit which was to encircle HAGUENAU. The other unit was unknown.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

- a. To attack again during the night using the mill and tanks as a toe-hold.
- b. To reenforce and make another attempt to cross the Moder River in several places nearby.
- c. To attack with tanks and infantry from Camp D' Oberhoffen.

E. E. MITCHELL

S - 2

HEADQUARTERS 315TH INFANTRY
Office of the Commanding Officer

68
28 Jan. 45
APO 79, U. S. Army,
28 January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Security Instructions.

TO : All Units, 315th Infantry.

1. In conformance to instructions from VI Corps concerning security, the following instructions are issued. (Ref. Security Instruction No. 1, Hq., VI Corps, 22 Jan. 1945; Counterintelligence Instructions, Hq. VI Corps, 1 Dec. 1944; and Conduct of Troops in Alsace, Hq. 7th Army, 15 Sept. 1944).

2. Attacks by Paratroopers:

- a. All units will be particularly alert for attempted paratroop attack or infiltration by the enemy (day or night).
- b. Upon confirmation of such an attack, unit involved will transmit information to this headquarters by the fastest possible means.
- c. Information will give location and number of enemy.
- d. Units will be particularly careful not to turn in false alarms or unconfirmed reports.
- e. For Paratroop landings in rear areas, Corps Hq. has a definite plan for destroying those successful in their landings.

3. Security of Towns and Bivouac areas.

- a. Special attention will be given to security measures of towns and bivouac areas immediately in rear of front line positions.
- b. Guards and road blocks will be established at strategic points on all sides of such areas to stop enemy patrols and/or infiltration.
- c. Personnel manning defense posts will spot check civilians and military personnel during the day and will halt all personnel at night.
- d. Proper identification for military personnel is the correct answer to the pass word unless circumstances warrant further check.

4. Counterintelligence Instructions concerning Civilians.

- a. No civilians will be employed in any capacity until approved by A.C. of S., G-2.
- b. Under no circumstances will civilians be allowed within a military installation unless they have been investigated, have proper identifications, and the entrance is a military necessity.
- c. No individual will be permitted to cross our lines into enemy territory without authorization of the A.C. of S., G-2.
- d. The carrying or use of cameras and binoculars by civilians is expressly forbidden.
- e. The transporting of unauthorized civilians in government vehicles is prohibited.
- f. Curfew for civilians is 1930 to 0700.
- g. Those civilians behaving suspiciously will be evacuated through PW channels.

5. Conduct of Troops In Alsace:

- a. Troops are to be reminded that, in spite of use of the German language, people of Alsace are French and are to be treated as other liberated Allied populations.
- b. There will be, however, a minority of Germans who have moved in during the German occupation. This makes the necessity for security much more important.
- c. Misconduct toward the population will not be tolerated. An Alsatian is not a German because he speaks German.

Sec. Instrs. 315th Inf. (28 Jan. 1945) cont'd

5. Use by The Enemy of American Uniforms and Equipment.

- a. Higher headquarters has acquired definite information that the enemy has made several ambitious plans for the use of his troops in American uniforms and American equipment.
- b. These troops generally speak excellent English and have missions of sabotage, disruption of communications, obtaining information, and killing Allied officers and soldiers.
- c. Every soldier must be alert to such efforts and use the utmost caution.
- d. Under no circumstances will troops give the password to unidentified military personnel.
- e. Those Germans apprehended in American uniform will be evacuated through P.M. channels without delay. Do not permit removal of American uniforms.

By Order of Colonel SCHRIVER:

CHARLES A. RIEGLE
Captain, 315th Infantry,
Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BATTALION
315th Infantry

48
29 Jan 45
APO 79, U.S. ARMY,
28 Jan 1945.

Subject: Organization of Bazooka Stalking Team.

To : S-3, 315th Infantry.

Experience has shown that to ~~try~~ to make a "Stalking Team" an organic part of a platoon or company is not too satisfactory. When the need arises for the use of a "Stalking Team" one or more of the members of the team has become a casualty or for some reason is missing.

We have found the following composition to work quite well-a definite leader must be appointed-preferably an Officer or NCO. The team should have two bazookas. Quite often when getting into position the bazooka becomes damaged or for some damm reason doesn't work. The fire support of the team can only be decided upon when mission is given to it. Some of the determining factors being: nearness of tank to our friendly elements, need for speed of operation, terrain the party must operate over (village, woods, etc.)

All members of any front line unit should carry at least one hand grenade.

For the Battalion Commander:

JOHN E. POTTS,
Captain, 315th Infantry,
S-3.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
315th Infantry

APD 79, U.S. Army,
28 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Organization of Bazooka Stalking Teams.

TO : Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry.

1. With regard to the organization of Bazooka Stalking Teams as outlined by Regt'l AT Officer, the following recommendations are submitted:

- a. Composition - Three (3) men per team - One (1) team per rifle platoon to operate with support squad of platoon. Two (2) teams per Co. Hqs. to operate as a team when needed.
- b. Armament as outlined by Regt'l AT Officer is satisfactory - A larger bazooka (similar to German Panzerfaust) is needed if bazooka teams are to be effective.
- c. One Bazooka Stalking Team per AT Gun.
- d. Two Bazooka Stalking Teams attached to Bn. Hqs. to operate as a team on call. Personnel to be taken from Bn. A&P Platoon.

For the Battalion Commander:

FRANCIS J. CAPELLI
Capt., Infantry,
S-3.

FIRST BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
315th Infantry

APO 79, U. S. Army
29 Jan 1945.

SUBJECT: Organization of Bazooka Teams.

TO : Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry.

1. Composition: Team should consist of four (4) men - Two men armed with the bazooka and carry three rounds of ammunition each. One man armed with M-1 with grenade launcher and carrying three rounds of bazooka ammunition and six AT grenades. One man armed with BAR or Tommy Gun and carrying three rounds of AT grenades

2. Duties of Individuals: Men armed with bazooka fire bazooka - man armed with M-1 load bazooka and furnish additional protection with AT launcher, man armed with automatic weapon load bazooka and furnish protection to bazooka team from enemy Infantry.

3. Organizations Within Rifle Companies: Two per rifle platoons is excessive. To use twenty-one men from our present strength of companies for AT protection would be a waste of striking power. One per platoon and one in company headquarters is believed to be a better organization.

4. Employment: AT protection in a rifle company must be a secondary role. The primary duty of an Infantryman is to destroy the enemy.

IVAN L. CALL,
Lt. Col., Infantry,
Commanding.

DECLASSIFIED

NVD 735017

AUTHORITY

BY FW NARA DATE: 1-26

Attn Bn and Sep Co Cmdrs:

(109) 18 Jan '45

For your information and consideration. Give careful thought to composition armament, and duty or mission, and return with your informal notes of your thoughts on this subject as pertains to employment in your unit.

File

Hoover
H OOVER,
Maj, S-3

ANTI-TANK COMPANY
315th Infantry

APO 79, U. S. Army
18 January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Organization of Bazooka Stalking Teams.


TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 315th Infantry.

1. Composition:
 - a. Team should consist of three (3) man party. One armed with bazooka and .45 Cal. pistol., carrying three (3) rounds of bazooka ammunition. One man armed with a carbine and a grenade launcher plus three bazooka rounds and four (4) grenades, two A.T. and two W.P. grenades. One man armed with M-1 or preferably B.A.R.
2. Duties of Individuals in Stalking Teams:
 - a. Man armed with the bazooka:
 - (1) Operates the bazooka.
 - b. Man armed with the Carbine:
 - (1) Loads bazooka.
 - (2) Fires on tanks or personnel with launcher.
 - c. Man armed with M-1 or B.A.R.
 - (1) Use solely for protection of men operating bazooka, from enemy personnel which accompany tanks.
3. Organization within Rifle Companies:
 - a. Two per rifle platoon.
 - b. One per weapons platoon.
4. Employment within Rifle Companies:
 - a. Bazooka team to be kept in rear of support squad and use solely for A.T. protection.
5. Organization within A.T. Company:
 - a. One per A.T. gun squad.
 - b. Used to cover dead space in A.T. defense. Also can be used on call for tanks outside of their sector.

JACK D. STONE
Capt., 315th Inf.
Commanding.

[Handwritten signature]

AT 5
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 22

OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
 UNIT REPORT # 204
 315 TH INF.
 SCALE: 1/25,000 26 JAN 45
Official Approval
 5-3

SECRET

Ref No A-92

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
 APO 758

.....
 : SECRET :
 : Auth: CG, 7 Army :
 : Init: JK :
 : Date: 16 Jan 45 :
 :.....

16 January 1945

TRAINING MEMORANDUM

NUMBER

AA SL's EMPLOYED IN GROUND ROLE

1. General. Recent experiments and reports from other Army areas have proved that AA SL's can be employed to produce the illumination required for military operations at night to include support of front-line activity.

2. Types of Illumination. The types of illumination required for specific operations fall in three general classifications:

- a. Combat light -- involving illumination in front of our lines.
- b. Movement and working light -- involving illumination in areas in rear of our front lines.
- c. Guide Beacons -- for pin-pointing references or for marking any particular axis.

3. Illumination for Specific Operations.

- a. Combat light:
 - (1) Attacks by infantry and/or tanks.
 - (2) Patrols.
 - (3) Mine lifting.
 - (4) Artillery observation.
- b. Movement and working light:
 - (1) Area lighting.
 - (2) Road lighting.
 - (3) Illumination of air OP landing strips.
 - (4) Bridge building and other engineer tasks.
- c. Guide beacons:
 - (1) Orientation beacons.
 - (2) Axis beacons.

4. Effect of Weather Conditions and Smoke on Ground Illumination: Particles in the air will cause reflection of light which will affect the ground illumination.

a. In freezing weather, the air will usually contain small floating ice crystals which will give very good reflection and ground illumination.

SECRET

b. Light fog and rain of any type will give good reflection and ground illumination. Heavy fog also will give good reflection and ground illumination but poor lateral visibility on the ground surface because there will be too much reflection from a large number of fog particles. Also, heavy fog reduces the effective range of the SL.

c. Smoke, when used as a fine haze, will have the same effect as a light fog. Oil type smoke, from Mechanical Smoke Generators, will serve to screen SL's. The smoke from an M-2 Mechanical Generator, at a distance of approximately seventy (70) yards, has stopped completely the light from an SL.

5. Notes on Specific Types of Combat Light.

a. Attacks by Infantry and Tanks.

For any attacks limited to a depth of penetration of 6,000 yards, searchlights will have no difficulty in producing as much light as is required. Tests indicate that SL illumination will prove especially beneficial in negotiating difficult terrain such as a river crossing. It will be emphasized, however, that illumination will be kept to a minimum in order to avoid assistance to the enemy, since a searchlight beam is likely to reach over a considerable distance into enemy territory. In this way, it might assist him in regrouping or reinforcing. Best results can be expected in rain or when lights are reflected from a low ceiling. The use of smoke in conjunction with SL's in forward areas will screen operations as well as provide artificial ceiling to reflect the beams.

For a regimental operation over a 1500-yd front aiming at penetration to a depth of 2000 yds, adequate light would be provided by three searchlights, spaced about 800 yds apart, 5000 to 7000 yds behind the line of departure. If the attack involved a deeper penetration, an additional forward row of three searchlights would be sited 3000 yds behind the line of departure, to be employed only as the attack developed.

If suitable communications are available, the lighting can be adjusted for the various phases of the operation; namely, the approach, the assault, the consolidation of the position and the reolling of the counterattack.

The most straightforward form of lighting would be provided by lights sited in a row parallel to the line of departure, pointing directly forward along the axis of attack. Such lights would be of considerable assistance in maintaining direction. On the other hand, if ground is favorable, greater flexibility of lighting can be obtained by siting a forward group of three searchlights on the flank, so that they will reach diagonally across the line of the attack. One or more of such lights may be employed to dazzle the enemy by direct illumination of enemy positions.

b. Patrols.

Except in special cases, it would be impracticable to provide special lighting for any particular patrol, since large areas are likely to be covered by even one searchlight beam.

c. Mine lifting.

No difficulty should be experienced in providing the full amount of light required for such an operation. It may be important that a rather wide front should be covered by such lighting, so that no specific point in which work is being carried out is indicated to the enemy.

d. Harassing fire.

When searchlights are sited close to the front line and ground is favorable, country up to a distance of 6000 to 9000 yds should be visible

S E C R E T

TM #2, Hq 7th Army, 16 January 1945 (Cont'd).

from a forward OP. The illumination provided should always be adequate for seeing any movement of vehicles on roads.

6. Notes on Movement and Working Lights.

a. Area Lighting.

If it is necessary to illuminate the whole area behind the front line in order to assist maintenance, movement of units, or the occupation of an area, best results will be obtained by siting searchlights 800 yds apart well behind the front. By adjusting the angle of elevation and the dispersion of the beam, a varying intensity of illumination can be produced. If searchlights are placed unnecessarily far forward, and particularly if they are maintained in focus, the majority of illumination will be given over enemy territory.

b. Road lighting.

When the lighting of a single road and not an area is involved, it is considered that one searchlight beam will provide sufficient illumination for traffic without headlights over 7000 yds of road. For this purpose the light should be sited near the road and screened to its immediate flank to prevent dazzle.

c. Assistance to Air OP's.

Air OP's can be substantially assisted in navigation and landing by means of searchlights. By lighting the strip, the dusk flight can be continued until darkness.

d. Light for Special Tasks.

If the lighting is required for such an operation as bridge building, the best results would be obtained by using two beams so as to avoid the production of any substantial shadow.

7. Notes on Guide Beacons.

a. Orientation Beacons.

If two searchlights are exposed some 4000 yds apart and 4000 yds behind the front at known surveyed positions, a method will be provided by which infantry can pin-point their position at any time during patrols or other similar operations.

b. Axis Beacons.

Any required axis can be indicated by exposure of two high-angle beams directly in line with the required axis. An alternative method would be the exposure of a single beam at a low-angle, pointing along the required axis.

c. Night bombing by Medium or Fighter-bombers.

Night bombers can be assisted when operating in close support by means of searchlights. This assistance can be provided by exposing a high-angle beam at a surveyed position known to the Air Forces, or by placing an intersection of beams over the actual target to be bombed, or over an agreed point.

The former method, although possibly not possessing the theoretical accuracy of the second, has the advantage of requiring only that the pilot fly on a fixed bearing for a predetermined time after passing over the searchlight. The latter method may involve considerable difficulty

S E C R E T

in distinguishing the intersection if other beams are being used for other forms of lighting.

8. Deception.

Wherever combat light is being used, some form of cover plan must be employed to avoid lights disclosing the precise time and place of an attack. Thus, lights for the attack should be exposed for short periods on most nights, although no attack is taking place. However, they should not be exposed long enough to permit the enemy to rely on them as movement light. During a real attack, additional lights should be exposed to the flanks of the actual area being covered.

It has been found that by concentration of an intersection of beams over any particular point of the enemy's front, the enemy can be deceived into deciding that an attack at that point is imminent.

9. Test Results.

Specific results reported on test in Italy are listed for information.

a. Advantages:

- (1) Traffic, messengers, and supply trains of all types were assisted greatly and were able to move with greater speed (this seems to be the benefit most consistently mentioned).
- (2) Infantry attacks were permitted greater speed of movement. Being in shadow, the forward sides of buildings and brush were available for use by our troops. The enemy could not observe our troops in such locations since he was facing the lights.
- (3) Patrols were aided in orientation and maintaining direction.
- (4) Area of vision of forward OP's were increased to 75 or 100 feet.
- (5) Engineer route maintenance operations and signal maintenance were made easier and faster.
- (6) Service of artillery pieces and occupation of positions were facilitated.
- (7) Work of litter bearers and ambulances was aided greatly.
- (8) Operation of air OP's and spotting of enemy gun flashes were not hampered.

b. Disadvantages:

- (1) Our own troops were silhouetted, although in most cases it was possible to eliminate this by changing azimuth or elevation of light. In certain cases it was necessary to extinguish the light.
- (2) Where terrain caused dark areas to occur between beams, drivers had particular difficulty when entering a dark area from a lighted one. (This was partially eliminated by an increased number of lights sited close together).

c. POW statements:

- (1) Enemy movement was restricted on forward slopes, but

S E C R E T

TM #2, Hq 7th Army, 16 January 1945 (Cont'd).

was aided on reverse slopes.

(2) In open country enemy was permitted observation of our troops at a greater distance.

(3) Artificial shadows helped to conceal our infantry.

(4) In general, enemy vision was adversely affected as a result of looking into lights.

(5) Enemy troops were deprived of freedom of movement since they felt they were being observed whether this was true or not.

10. Vulnerability.

Experience indicates that lights are difficult to destroy. Whenever possible, they should be sited at least 3000 yds behind the front lines, preferably on a reverse slope, so that the point of origin of the beam is not visible to the enemy. The vulnerability of SL's can be greatly reduced by spacing them so that groups of lights can be operated intermittently. This prevents the enemy from placing accurate artillery fire on a fixed light.

11. Duration of Searchlights.

A searchlight can be used continuously for only 40 minutes, at which time the beam must be turned off for a period of 2 - 3 minutes to change the carbons.

Since the lamps in present use were not originally designed for continuous operation over several hours, breakdowns may occur. For this reason, when a single beam is especially sited for a specific task such as providing an intersection to work with night bombers, a stand-by light must be available. This is not considered necessary for the other types of lighting. There the primary problem is to cover an area, and the provision of one spare light for every three or four can solve the problem.

12. Organization of Searchlight Battery.

The searchlight battery is a semi-mobile unit consisting of 12 searchlights divided into two platoons of six lights each. Each platoon has four organic $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks and requires eight additional $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks if it is to be fully mobile. Within the platoon, communication is by wire to each searchlight. Platoons may be linked to battery headquarters by wire, but in addition, an SCR 284 radio net is available for communication with the battery.

13. Searchlight Positions.

Following are some of the essentials of a good position:

a. "It must have defilade. A perfect position is one in which the light is placed on a reverse slope of less than seven degrees, at least 200 yds from the crest."

b. "It should not be on a line parallel to the front, with any other light."

c. "Positions must be echeloned in depth within a band approximately 3000 to 8000 yds behind the forward elements."

S E C R E T

d. "Positions should be from 800 to 1000 yds apart, to provide continuous illumination."

By command of Lieutenant General PATCH:

A. A. WHITE,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.



OFFICIAL:

John S. Guthrie
JOHN S. GUTHRIE,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S, G-3.


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S E C R E T

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OVERLAY
 FRANK 725,000
 DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
 314 TO INF.
 23 JAN 45



31
 24 Jan 45

~~C 72~~

[illegible]

22

File *(81)* *31 Jan '45*
S-3 REPORT

FROM: 0001 31 Jan '45
TO: 2400 31 Jan '45
PLACE: Vic Weitbruch
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE:
2100 31 Jan '45

NO: 209
MAPS: No change.

1. OUR FRONT LINES:
(No change)
2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:
(No change)
3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:
314 Inf on left, 142 Inf on Rt., 904 FA Bn D/S., Co "C"
304 Med Bn atchd., Co "C" 304 Engr Bn D/S., Co "A" 47
Tk Bn (minus one plat) atchd., Co "A" 813 TD Bn D/S., Btry "B"
353 AA Bn (-) suppt.
4. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:
315th remained in defensive position during the period.
Patrols from 2nd Bn crossed Moder Riv but did not take a
PW. Engrs established foot bridge across Moder for patrol
operations. Light harassing mortar & arty fire received
in sector during period. Light traffic again observed
from SCHIRHOFFEN to SESSENHEIM. Arty fired on enemy 75mm how.
and probably neutralized same.
5. Warmer - some rain - visibility good.
6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:
Excellent.
7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:
See paragraph 5.

Martin
MARTIN

Capt, Asst S-3

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
Office of the Security Officer
APO 46, U.S. Army

SECRET

By Authority of 31 Jan 45
CG VI Corps
Initials RL
26 Jan 1945

26 January 1945

AMENDMENT NO. 1

TO
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1

Par 3. a., c., d., 4. e., and 5. c., Security Instructions No. 1, Hq VI Corps, dated 22 January 1945, is amended to read as follows:

3. a. 1st Armd Gp (reinforced by one (1) platoon, Btry "D", 533d AAA AW Bn) will maintain continuous patrols in areas indicated on attached overlay to check security of military installations, arrest suspicious individuals, and arrest civilians violating curfew regulations. Civilians arrested will be turned over to VI Corps CIC, military personnel will be brought to the closest PW cage. (See attached letter, Hq VI Corps, subject: "Counterintelligence Instructions", dated 1 December 1944)

c. The C.O., 1st Armd Group, will monitor the AAAIS net (2280 kc) at his CP and will establish radio communication with his patrols. Patrols will be mounted in radio equipped vehicles. 35th AAA Brigade will establish wire communication with the 1st Armd Group.

d. In event of an attack the C.O., 1st Armd Group, will be prepared to immediately dispatch two (2) platoons to threatened area until the mobile reserve (see par 4, below) can be moved to the area.

4. e. Upon arrival of the mobile reserve in the threatened area, the C.O., 256th Engr C Bn, will report to C.O., 1st Armd Group.

5. c. Patrols and staff officers of 1st Armd Group and staff officers 35th AAA Brigade will investigate the effectiveness of check posts, perimeter defenses, Military Police, and sentinels on important installations within the area shown on attached overlay.

By command of Major General BROOKS:

J. R. TOWNSEND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
VI Corps Security Officer

OFFICIAL:

Francis C. Grevenberg
FRANCIS C. GREVENBERG
Lt Col, CAC
S-3

DISTRIBUTION:
"Special"

S E C R E T

REF NO: 42-A

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
Office of the Security Officer
APO 46, U.S. Army

SECRET

By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials 706
28 Jan 1945

47
31 Jan 45

28 January 1945

AMENDMENT NO. 2
TO
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1

Par 5. b. (2), Security Instructions No. 1, Hq VI Corps, dated 22 January 1945, is amended to read as follows:

5. b. (2) Except along main supply routes, the leading vehicles of a convoy will be stopped for identification of the convoy. When properly identified, the remaining vehicles of the convoy will be permitted to pass the post without stopping.

(a) C.O., 1st Armd Gp, will designate check posts along MSR's which will stop convoy vehicles.

By command of Major General BROOKS:

J. R. TOWNSEND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
VI Corps Security Officer

OFFICIAL:

Francis C. Grevenberg
FRANCIS C. GREVENBERG
Lt Col, CAC
S-3

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
TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

19 January 1945

NUMBER

3:

1. The M4A3E8 is now being employed in the Seventh Army Sector.
2. All personnel will be instructed in the proper identification of this new American Tank.
3. Following are the principal points of identification:



- (1) Standard medium Tank hull.
- (2) Long Gun Tube with a Muzzle Brake (This is a common characteristic of German Tanks. This tank is the first friendly armored vehicle with a muzzle brake on its gun to enter action in Seventh Army.)
- (3) New type track suspension. (Horizontal Volute Bogey)
- (4) Wide tracks. 23 inch tread. (This is also a characteristic of the German Mark V and Mark VI tanks.)

By command of Lieutenant General PATCH:

A. A. WHITE,
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL

John S. Guthrie
JOHN S. GUTHRIE,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.


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Incl: Photographs of M4A3E8 Tank - Plate I-III

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SIDE VIEW
M4 A3 E8 TANK




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AERIAL VIEW
M4 A3 E8 TANK

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


LEFT REAR VIEW
M4 A3 E8 TANK



LEFT FRONT VIEW
M4 A3 E8 TANK

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FRONT VIEW
M4 A3 E8 TANK



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REAR VIEW
M4 A3 E8 TANK

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AUTHORITY

BY FW NARA DATE: 1-26

Enclosed subject matter from Battle Experience reports of 36th Div. are forwarded for your information and use of any or all material contained therein. Especially of interest are notes on road blocks and check points for defense.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH TROOP BRIGADE
U. S. Army

19 September 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM

10.

17

ROAD BLOCKS

1. A Commander of the road block must be designated and each sub-commander, Rifle Machine Gun, Mortar, Anti-Tank, Tank Destroyer or Tank must know who the road block Commander is and that the road block Commander's orders are paramount.
2. Reconnaissance for location of road block must be made by the Commander, and all sub-unit Commanders, of the road block. Each sub-unit Commander makes recommendations for employment of his weapons and personnel, but the decision as to location and use must be made by the Road Block Commander. Against their recommendation, if he so determines.
3. Reconnaissance at least a mile beyond road block to front and flanks, or to contact, must be made by the Road Block Commander.
4. Road Blocks must be established 500-1000 yards in front of town or cross-roads to be defended, except in unusual circumstances. (Night, close proximity of enemy, extremely unfavorable terrain permit closer location)
5. Antitank Guns, Tank Destroyers, Tanks, used as part of road block, must be at least 150 yds or more from road defended. They must have flanking, destructive fire on road and its approaches.
6. Machine Guns and Infantry must be used to screen front and flanks of blocking gun. The weight of Infantry and Machine Guns will be off the roads to front and flanks.
7. All installations, Anti-Tank Guns, Tank Destroyers, Tanks, Machine Guns, Infantry will use natural cover. Woods, brush, hay stacks, houses, barns, munro piles, cut branches good cover or camouflage, in that order.
8. a. Spoil of fox holes or trenches will be covered or carried away.
b. No vehicles, equipment, laundry will be exposed to give away position.
c. Men of road block will keep under cover from possible enemy observation.
9. The object of a road block is, not to drive the enemy off, but to suck him in and then destroy him by flanking fire. (Capture is permissible). Opening fire at long range will be discouraged. Long range is principally valuable for observation, not for fire. Attack of enemy is the ideal.
10. Listening - Listening posts must be established well to front. These must have means of signalling approach of enemy.
11. Communication to next higher unit, company or battalion, must be arranged. This may be telephone, radio, jeep or foot messenger.
12. If the road block is our front line, friendly vehicles, going toward enemy, must be stopped and warned their further forward progress is at their own discretion.
13. When a road block is employed in a delaying action or where it is not intended to stop the enemy on the road by our troops, physical obstacles will be added to fire defense. These include felled trees, mines, blown bridges, etc. Orders of Commander establishing road block will specify what, if any, physical obstacles may be, or will be, employed. These obstacles are principally valuable to stop enemy in your field of fire and therefore must not be too far out.

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When possible, defensive artillery concentrations should be set up and re-
concentrated. Concentrations and numbers should be in the hands of the roadblock
commander. He can call for these through radio, telephone, or flares. Artillery will
only be used in case of serious attack.

15. Common Errors:

- a. Locating road block too close to village or road junction defended.
- b. Placing defense guns on, or too close to, road defended.
- c. No reconnaissance beyond, or to flanks after roadblock is established.
- d. No Commander of road block.
- e. No inspection of roadblock by Commander ordering its establishment.
- f. No communication organized between roadblock Commander and his Commanding Officer.
- g. Complete loss of aggressive attitude by Road Block Commander and garrison.
- h. Casual attitude of roadblock, due to coffee, wine, jell tones, inertia, stupidity. Lack of alertness.
- i. Lack of coordination and mutual support within road block.
- j. Failure to study and appreciate the ground.
- k. Lack of depth in position and in fires.
- l. Little or no protection for flanks.
- m. Failure to dig in.
- n. Failure to use P.F.I., Maquis and French civilians for reinforcement, and information.

By command of Major General DAHLQUIST:

STEWART T. VINCIG, Jr.
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Harry B. Kelton
HARRY B. KELTON,
Major, Adjutant General's Department
Asst Adjutant General

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J. S.

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HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO #36, U. S. Army

11 October 1944

(3)

TRAINING MEMORANDUM

NO. **18**

BATTALION TRAINING PROGRAM

1. When Infantry Battalions come off the line, the following schedule will be adopted:

a. For forty-eight hours after the Battalion arrives at the bivouac area, there will be no training. Every effort will be made to secure the maximum amount of rest and comfort for the men. Hot meals, showers, clean clothes, indoor sleeping facilities and every arrangement for rest and relaxation will be provided. During this period, Officers must check clothing, equipment and feet. Men will be required to clean personal and crew-served weapons during this period.

b. On the third day and until the Battalion goes back into the line, the following training schedule will be pursued in detail.

2. Purpose of training schedule:

a. This training schedule will provide an opportunity to iron out the deficiencies in combat that company and battalion leaders have observed in their commands.

b. It will give new officers and non-coms an opportunity to work with their commands and learn the capabilities of their men.

c. IT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP S.O.P.s. (STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES) WITHIN THE SQUAD AND PLATOON FOR ANY COMBAT SITUATION.

d. If the Battalion receives replacements it will give these men an invaluable opportunity to work with their unit before combat and will give leaders a chance to weld them into the team.

e. It will provide Heavy Weapons Companies time to familiarize new men with the weapons and increase the efficiency of old men.

3. Conduct of Training:

a. As the training schedule is not long, a maximum exploitation of the time available must be made. All Battalion staff and company officers, including medical and chaplains, will participate.

b. Every emphasis will be placed on aggressive action. A large percentage of our casualties are the direct result of leaders doing nothing when their unit comes under fire. The best way to prevent casualties is to kill the man that's shooting at you.

c. The fundamental principle offire and movement and teamwork within the squad and platoon will be the main subject of the training.

d. Clarity and simplicity of orders, simplicity of maneuver, and speed and thoroughness of execution will be stressed.

e. In so far as possible, problems will be run over the same ground that the squad or platoon fought over. They will consist of the same situation as the battle situation and mistakes made in combat will be pointed out and corrected.

(1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

f. Every problem will consist of (1) dry run (2) wet run, where practical. Correction will be made when the error is committed. A short and pertinent critique - not to exceed ten minutes - will be conducted by the instructor at the end of the problem.

g. Emphasis will be placed on identification and location of enemy weapons and the means of knocking them out.

h. Familiarization with our fragmentation grenade, rifle grenade, bazooka and enemy mines will be included.

4. Explanation of Subject Matter:

a. Procedure to locate Enemy:

When the Squad is fired upon:

- (1) Each man drops, or double-times, to position of cover.
- (2) Each man fires several rounds at position where he thinks fire came from. This is automatic and done without command.
- (3) After several minutes of fire the squad leader signals: (Cease Firing)
- (4) Squad leader asks: "Does anyone see the enemy?"
- (5) If someone says: "YES!", squad leader orders him to fire tracer at where he thinks enemy is.
- (6) If no one knows, squad leader orders one of his men to move forward to another position of cover, ten to fifteen yards away.
- (7) If enemy fires at him, squad leader repeats #4 and #5.
- (8) If enemy does not fire, squad leader moves another man--then two--etc.

NOTE: Squad area fire as in "2" above will first, discourage the enemy from shooting, and secondly, let him know that you are strong and not just a couple of men. An enemy observer will not keep his head up when he is being shot at.

USE YOUR FIRE-POWER TO KEEP ENEMY'S HEAD DOWN.

USE YOUR FIRE-POWER TO SCARE HELL OUT OF HIM.

USE YOUR FIRE-POWER TO KILL HIM.

Worst possible action to take when fired on:

- (a) Hit the ground and stay there doing nothing.
- (b) try to crawl away.

This gives the enemy plenty of time to bring down mortar and artillery on you, and instead of his being attacked, he is really attacking you with fire. Instead of his taking casualties, he is inflicting them on you.

b. Attack Practice:

"Attack Practice" is an attempt to develop S.O.P. within the squad and platoon that can be applied with slight modification to any given attack situation in combat.

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It should be looked upon as a "play" or maneuver, just as a football team has a "play" which it employs when the quarter-back gives the signal.

(1) Squad "Attack Practice" will be taught along the following lines:

- (a) The squad is the smallest complete unit in the regiment.
- (b) It has a leader and it is a TEAM composed of two main groups: (1) the fire group. (2) The maneuver group.
- (c) The fire group usually forms around the BAR and is composed of the BAR man, assistance BAR man, ammunition bearer, the scouts, and the assistant squad leader.
- (d) The maneuver group is usually composed of the five remaining riflemen and is lead by the squad leader.
- (e) Though this is the logical breakdown, either group can be designated as the base of fire, depending on which can be maneuvered more easily.
- (f) When the squad is fired upon, squad leader goes through "procedure to locate enemy" (see above). Once enemy is located, squad leader designates one group as base of fire, immediately disengages other group and proceeds to flank enemy position. When maneuver element is in position to assault enemy position, squad leader throws assault grenade (a prearranged signal) and assaults position.
- (g) The base of fire group continues to fire on enemy position while the maneuver group is moving and until prevented from so doing by its assault. Upon the assault of the maneuver element, the base of fire group does not cease firing, but lifts its fire above the heads of the assault troops as they overrun the position. If maneuver unit is held up, base of fire unit moves toward enemy and closes with him.
- (h) The assault is made in a skirmish line with bayonets fixed and troops deliver "Assault Fire" as they advance.
- (i) After overrunning the position, the maneuver element proceeds at least 200 yards beyond the position in the original direction of advance and organizes a hasty defense. It is joined as soon as possible by the base of fire group which starts forward as soon as it is evident that the enemy position is taken. Squad reorganization is then effected.

(2) Platoon "Attack Practice" will be taught along the following lines:

- (a) The "Play" or "Maneuver" as shown in squad tactics can be applied to the platoon.
- (b) The platoon should be looked upon as a team with three squads and a leader.
- (c) In movement of the platoon one squad is designated as the scout squad. This is because:
 - (1) Often the enemy will not fire on two scouts-- thus sucking in the rest of the squad.
 - (2) This squad is a unit and can take care of itself when fired on.
 - (3) It is already in a position to shoot back and can engage the enemy immediately.
- (d) The platoon leader, in the advance, designates a prominent terrain feature to which the scout squad will move and usually a route to it.

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- (e) The squad moves up there and if it draws no fire the platoon leader and his command group moves up to it and designates the next bound. The other two squads are one terrain feature behind him.
 - (f) If the scout squad is fired upon it immediately becomes the base of fire and the platoon leader makes his estimate of the situation.
 - (g) He then sends a runner back to the platoon sergeant who is leading the remaining two squads and orders him to move them to the flank where he will meet them and lead them as the maneuver element.
 - (h) If the fire is sufficiently strong or if he thinks it necessary he will order one of the remaining squads to build up a firing line beside the scout squad. This will give him two squads as base of fire and one squad as maneuver element.
 - (i) If he uses two squads to flank with he may decide to drop off one BAR half way around the flank to aid the base of fire group by delivering enfilade fire on the position. When he gets well to the flank and abreast of the enemy position he may send his other BAR around to the rear and cut off the escape of the enemy.
 - (j) The assault is made in the same manner as described in "Squad Tactics" above. When the position is overrun one squad precedes at least 200 yards beyond it in the direction of assault, the other squad does the same in the original direction of advance, and the base of fire moves up and goes to the exposed flank. Then platoon reorganization is effected.
 - (k) The "ASSAULT FIRE" delivered by the maneuver element may be defined as rapid aimed fire from the hip on the enemy for the purpose of making him keep his head down while you move up for the kill.
 - (l) On the assault signal, the base of fire group should greatly increase the volume of its fire.
 - (m) A man in a foxhole cannot tell by the crack of the bullet whether it is two inches above his head or twenty feet.
- c. Night Problem: One night problem will be held lasting three hours. Squad infiltration. A platoon is ordered to infiltrate through enemy's line to secure certain vital ground (hill, crossroad, bridge) in preparation for a Regimental Attack in the morning. Platoon leader decides to infiltrate by squads, giving each a different route and assembling and reorganizing his platoon on the position.

TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR RIFLE COMPANIES

FIRST DAY:

- 0800-0900: Cover and concealment - How to use it. Practical work in observation. Observing an "Enemy" group, members of which are exposed, partially exposed, and well concealed. Ball ammunition may be used to fire over heads of observing troops, if practical.
- 0900-1000: Squad movement across varied terrain. Use of squad formations, the skirmish line, the wedge, the extended squad column. Action taken when fired on. Procedure to locate enemy. (See Par "a", "Explanation of Subject Matter")
- 1000-1200: "Attack Practice" for the squad. Dry run. If possible, a demonstration squad should be used to run through a simple problem as platoon leader explains followed by practical work on similar problems by each squad in the platoon. Squad leaders to lead their squads, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and platoon guide to make corrections. (See Par. "b", "Explanation of Subject Matter").

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Afternoon: At some time in the afternoon company officers should inspect ordnance equipment for first and second echelon maintenance. This does not necessarily mean a formal inspection.

SECOND DAY:

0800-1200: "Attack Practice" for the squad. Dry Run. Problem should have several objectives, each to be attacked after reorganization of squad from last one taken is complete. (See Par "b", "Explanation of Subject Matter")

1300-1500 "Attack Practice" for the platoon. Dry Run. Demonstration by one plat. explained by company officer, followed by practical work by each rifle plat. on similar problems. (See Par "b (2)", "Explanation of Subject Matter").

THIRD DAY:

0800-1100 "Attack Practice" for the rifle platoon. Dry Run. Practical work for all platoons. (See Par "b (2)", "Explanation of Subject Matter").

Afternoon During this period an opportunity will be given Replacements to fire their individual weapons. A temporary range will be set up and each Replacement will fire a brief familiarization course.

1900-2200 Night problem. All rifle platoons. Infiltration. (See Par "c", "Explanation of Subject Matter").

FOURTH DAY

2 Hours "Attack Practice" for the rifle platoon. Wet Run. One platoon. The schedule for the fourth day is dependent on the range facilities available in the particular Battalion Area. Three areas should be available for firing ball ammunition to conduct this problem - one for each company. If this is not possible, the available facilities must be divided among the rifle platoons of the Battalion so that each one has an opportunity to run through the firing problem once. The schedule for this day will also include:

- 1 hour - On enemy mines and booby traps.
- 1 hour - Firing rifle grenades and bazooka Fragmentation Grenade.
- 2 Hours - "Dry Run" "Attack Practice" for the platoon. (See Par. "b (2)", "Explanation of Subject Matter")

REFERENCE: Memorandum, Deficiencies in Small Unit Combat, Hq. 36th Inf. Div., dated 20 September 1944.

Training Memorandum No. 17, Road Blocks, Hq. 36th Inf. Div., dated 19 September, 1944.

Letter, March Discipline, Office of the Commanding General, 13 September, 1944.

TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANIES AND WEAPONS PLATOONS OF RIFLE COMPANIES

FIRST DAY:

0800-1000 Gun Drill.
Emphasis to be on precision and accuracy and then speed. (If Replacements are not sufficiently familiar with weapon to start on gun drill, they must be segregated and given basic instruction in functioning by a qualified Officer and integrated into squads as soon as possible.)

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1000-1100 Selection and occupation of positions, alternate positions, and displacement. Qualities of good gun positions.

1100-1200 Gun Drill.

Afternoon Inspection by Company Officers of first and second echelon maintenance.

SECOND DAY

0800-1200 Same as First Day.

1300-1500 Machine Gun Marksmanship. Dry Run.

1300-1500 81 and 60 mm Mortar. * Receipt and transmission of Fire Orders.

THIRD DAY

0800-1200 Field Range Firing for Machine Guns, 81mm and 60mm Mortars within limitations of ammunition supply. If latter is prohibitive, field firing problems will be set up and fired dry run.

1300-1500 Gun Drill.

FOURTH DAY

1 Hour Enemy mines and booby traps.

1 Hour (Personnel concerned) Firing Rifle Grenades and bazookas.

3 Hours Platoon Problems. Dry Run
81mm Mortar platoon in the attack.
Heavy Machine Gun Platoon in the attack.
Weapons Platoon of a Rifle Company in the attack.

2 Hours Gun Drill

If a Fifth Day is available for training, a Rifle Company "Attack Practice" problem will be set up.

"Attack Practice" for the Company is essentially the same as for the platoon. One or two platoons becomes base of fire with added support of weapons platoon, and the remaining platoon or platoons become the maneuver element.

A Heavy Weapons Company in the attack problem will also be set up.

A minimum of six hours per day will be spent on this training.

By command of Major General DAHLQUIST:

STEWART T. VINCENT,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: c/ F. W. SLAXEN,
t/ F. W. SLAXEN,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AG of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 36, U. S. Army

20 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

NO. 70

DUTIES OF BATTALION COMMANDERS IN COMBAT

1. Be advised as to status of clothing, weapons, ammunition, water and do something about it if deficiencies exist. Continuous knowledge of status of ammunition and strength of all units.
2. Transfer, or recommend transfer, of officers when casualties or other reasons make it desirable or necessary.
3. Constant personal reconnaissance in combat whether in line or reserve.
4. Must keep close contact with flank units. Especially necessary when unit is one of our Allies.
5. Daily and/or nightly patrols. Give patrols plenty of time for preparation. Before 1500 hours. Battalion commander must initiate not wait for Regiment. Coordination with flank units and supporting fires. Use Battalion fires to help patrols and extricate them when necessary.
6. Know who and where enemy are.
7. Have ambush stations for enemy patrols.
8. Check personally and, if necessary, correct each company's dispositions in defense and in attack.
9. Keep a reserve no matter how small. Be sure its commander familiar with plans for his possible employment and that he and his unit are familiar by reconnaissance with routes to and locations of possible employment. Reserves should be used. Then create a new one.
10. Visit Battalion CP, Company CP's frequently.
11. Always be prepared for enemy counter-attacks even during your attack or temporary halts.
12. Get AT guns, and bazookas forward quickly to resist enemy tanks.
13. Make constant check on stragglers. Include rear areas. The only men of a platoon who help the Lieutenant take his objective are the men he has with him.
14. First Aid Stations must not be in the vicinity of CP's.
15. Personally check on defensive artillery and Cannon Company fires.

See they are registered.

See all units know the location of these fires and how to call for them.

FO's all night. FO's are working for you.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

16. Constantly harass enemy positions, routes or movements, by artillery, mortars and Cannon Company whenever opportunity offers and within ammunition limits.
17. If auxiliary weapons will help, ask for them - Tanks, TD's, CWS, Mortars, Air, etc.
18. Alternate gun emplacements for MG's, mortars, bazookas mandatory. Alternate foxholes.
19. Constantly improve position - Digging, wire, mines. Battalion A & P Platoon available.
20. Dig deep foxholes, hip deep minimum.
21. If attacked while relief is in progress, unit being relieved must remain in position until attack is driven off.
22. Front line units should not fire on enemy aircraft unless attacked.
23. Staff officers must alternate so that all get an adequate amount of sleep.
24. Battalions need no "Rear CP". Battalion C.O., S-3, and such other staff as you need, go forward with communication.
25. Before moving C.O. must personally assure himself that communications he needs accompany him.
26. Artillery CP's in front of our lines, or in exposed position, must be given adequate rifle protection.
27. When Battalion Commander or staff leave CP, must leave itinerary at CP and call back when feasible.
28. Use Air Photos.
29. Be advised as to sick rate and causes. If unusually large, investigate and do something about it.
30. Make spot checks by self and staff on speeding of vehicles and unauthorized use of captured or civilian M.T.
31. Continued check by self and staff on vehicle road discipline.
 - a. Fifty yards distance between vehicles.
 - b. Keep vehicles over to the right.
 - c. Off road at halts.
32. When accompanying marching troops, move vehicles by bounds of 2 - 5 miles from one parking area to another. For parking, use cross-roads, farm roads, etc., with turn around and cover when possible. Keep vehicles dispersed.
33. Have a fire plan to include all your weapons for every attack. Give specific orders to mortars, MG's, AT guns, TD's, and tanks as to location to set up in and targets.
34. In attack give specific objectives and routes. (Identifiable on ground) to each company and to other units.
35. Make flanking movements plenty wide. Specify distance of enveloping maneuver; if possible, by some easily recognized terrain object.
36. Use your Ex. C., S-2, S-3 and other staff officers for more to

C O N F I D E N T I A L

telephoneorderlies and map clerks. Make them visit front line companies in the attack to check situation and keep real contact.

37. Evaluate information received from patrols, front line companies, wounded, Maquis, civilians, etc. It invariably exaggerates the number of enemy and is ridiculously pessimistic about our own situation and casualties.

38. Men must be trained and ordered to follow closely behind artillery concentrations in attack.

By command of Major General DAHLQUIST:

STEWART T. VINCENT
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Harry B. Kelton
/t/ HARRY B. KELTON

Major, Adjutant General's Department
Asst Adjutant General

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO #36, U.S. Army

(This Memorandum
includes Changes
No 1, dated 22 Oct 44)

15 October 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM

NO. 19

RIFLE PLATOON IN DEFENSE

1. Platoon and company training in defense will be a part of training schedule of Battalions in reserve or rest areas. Method of training will be reconnaissance, tactical walk, digging in and setting up platoon combat groups and Company strong points.

2. In occupying a defensive position the primary requirements are in this order:

- a. Observation of enemy approaches.
- b. Field of fire (particular for machine guns).
- c. Protection from enemy fire.
- d. Cover from enemy observation.
- e. Preparation for counter-attack.

3. (1) It has been normal in this division to stress requirements 2c and d, and neglect or omit 2a, b, and e.

(2) Compliance with 2a and b demands the position be on forward edge of woods commanding open ground.

4. When a position has just been taken and a hasty defense has been set up, it is not always possible to satisfy all five requirements at once. But the platoon leader must start work immediately to see that they are met.

5. Explanation of Primary Requirements 2a. Observation of Enemy Approaches.

(1) This is obtained by establishing an OP-Listening Post, or if necessary a series of OP-Listening Posts in front of the defensive position.

(2) Their mission is to observe, listen, and be able to give warning of the approach of any enemy group.

(3) Communication with the platoon leader is by wire, but in case wire is blown out a flare signal should be arranged.

(4) A route of withdrawal is reconnoitered for the OP-Listening Post.

(5) OP-Listening Posts will also enable platoon leader to bring down artillery and mortar fire on the enemy at an early stage.

(6) At night 60mm mortars will remain laid and ready to fire flares to front and flanks of platoon or company position.

6. Explanation of Primary Requirements 2b. Fields of Fire.

(1) The Machine Gun.

(a) The machine gun forms the skeleton of defense.

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- (b) It will be placed where a maximum amount of raxing fire can be obtained.
- (c) If defending a woods, the machine gun should be at the edge of the woods commanding the open ground.
- (d) If it is necessary to defend in the woods and there is no open ground, fields of fire must be cut.
- (e) Great care should be taken that these are not obvious.
- (f) Fields of fire should cover the main route of approach, and in so far as the terrain permits, they should be coordinated and inter-locking with the machine gun fire of adjacent sectors.
- (g) All machine guns must be used. If normal crew is not available substitution should be made. Two men can fire a machine gun.
- (h) Machine guns will prepare alternate positions which should be 100-200 yards from primary positions.
- (2) Mortars and Artillery.
- (a) The grazing fire of the machine gun will not cover defilade - such as draws, ditches, stream beds, etc.
- (b) These gaps must be filled with mortar and artillery fire - those close in by the 60mm mortar - those further out by the 81mm mortar and artillery.
- (c) Each concentration must be numbered and the platoon leader must know these concentration numbers.
- (d) Platoon leaders must have overlays of mortar and artillery defensive concentrations located to their front and flanks.
- (3) Riflemen.
- (a) Never think of defense in terms of a line that is to be held.
- (b) It is not only undesirable, but impossible, to defend a position by placing riflemen in a line at 5 - 10 yards interval.
- (c) The job must be done by mutually supporting combat groups with a local reserve available for a counter-attack.
- (d) The combat group is formed by a rifle squad which builds up around the machine gun, giving it protection and supplementing its fire.
- (e) It has been frequently necessary in recent operations to assign even more than a normal company front to a platoon. Since a large area must be defended and because the platoon strength has often been depleted it is even more necessary that the combat post have good fields of fire. This necessitates getting down to the edge of the woods to cover open ground where a few men can do the work of many.
- (f) A combat group, in addition to protecting the machine gun, and delivering fire across an avenue of approach, should, where possible, be able to support by fire adjacent combat groups and give itself all around defense. (See diagram #1).
- (4) General.
- (a) An estimation of range to prominent objects in route of approach should be made and each man should know them.
- (b) Platoon leader and squad leader must personally check each man's field of fire and see that he knows his sector.
- (c) Mortar and artillery should register on their primary targets.
- (d) Bazookas should be part of the combat group with a field of fire in likely tank approaches.
- (e) Extra rifle grenades and hand grenades - 12 per man - should be brought to the position.

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(f) Wire obstacles carefully covered by machine gun fire should be erected.

(g) Mines and booby traps should be placed in all avenues of approach.

7. Explanation of Primary Requirements 2c. Protection from Enemy fire.

(1) Two fox holes at least hip deep and three yards apart are dug for each pair of riflemen in the combat group. Double fox holes may be used.

(2) The combat group as a whole must have alternate positions dug.

(3) Overhead cover of logs and earth should be constructed for each fox hole as soon as possible - and especially for the machine gun position.

(4) Covered dugouts on the reverse slope, or well back in the woods will be constructed where the men of the combat group can stay during artillery barrages, outposts can give ample warning of enemy approach.

(5) The support squad must have prepared positions to which it can move to support either combat group by fire.

(6) Fox holes should have drainage.

8. Explanation of Primary Requirements 2d. Protection from Enemy Observation.

(1) Since the combat group must be at the edge of open ground to get the maximum fields of fire, great care must be taken to camouflage positions.

(2) If under direct enemy observation, work must be done at night and all trace carefully camouflaged before morning.

(3) Camouflage that is about to die and change color must be renewed at night.

(4) There should be no movement at the positions when occupied.

9. General Comments on Requirements 2c and d.

(1) Every man must know the location of squad leader, plat. CP and company CP.

(2) Drainage facilities should be constructed for positions.

10. Explanation of Requirements 2e. Counter-attack.

(1) This is often the most decisive defensive measure.

(2) At no time is the attacker so vulnerable as when he has just taken a position. If a fresh force hits him hard and with speed, at precisely this moment it usually can kick him off the position and cause him heavy casualties.

(3) A support unit in each company and platoon should be held in preparation for this.

(4) The leader will make a thorough reconnaissance of all sectors where he may be employed and routes to them.

(5) He will formulate plans to deal with all these situations and be prepared to act on them.

11. Wire communication from platoon to company must be set up.

12. Artillery defensive concentrations must be set up, registered and platoon leader must be able to call for them by number. These should cover likely assembly areas, avenues of approach and generally reinforce SA fire.

13. As soon as time on position permits, the following minimum standards of utility and comfort will be established.

(1) Each man to have a round fighting hole. Foxhole.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) Each man or pair of men to have a covered sleeping trench with fifteen feet of the fighting hole. Slit trench.

(3) Sleeping trenches will be deep enough to move about in at a crouch. Overhead cover will be of 6" logs or greater with a foot of earth over the logs. The trench will be floored grate fashion so that there is a foot of space between floor and ground for drainage. Ground around trench to be ditched for drainage and the spoil well camouflaged with brush.

(4) Each rifle platoon to have a dugout about 100 yards in rear of the platoon position, large enough to shelter eight men. To be stered with timbers and made comfortable - its purpose is to dry out patrols and provide a place where men may take turns at relaxing and keeping warm.

(5) Platoon positions to be cleared of underbrush in all directions for 75 yards which will provide fields of fire for all weapons to a point beyond enemy hand grenade range. Must be done with care so as not to give away position or warn enemy to avoid.

(6) Sand bags will be used in shelter improvements.

By command of Major General DANLQUIST;

CHARLES H. OWENS
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Harry B. Kalton
/t/ HARRY B. KELTON
Major, Adjutant General's Department
Asst. Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Diagram #1

DISTRIBUTION "C" PLUS

150 - ea Inf. Regt.
150-- 442 RCT
2 - CG VI Corps


True Copy. Reproduced by G-3 Section
Hq. VI Corps 6 Jan. 45.

CONFIDENTIAL

Situation

1st Plat, Co. "A", plus 1 Sect. of
 HMG, 1 sect. LMG, defend woods "X".

Plat. strengths
 1st sq: 6 men
 2nd sq: 6 "
 3rd sq: 8 "
 Sect. HMG total 4 men
 Sect. LMG " 4 "
 Plat Hq. total 3 "



LEGEND




Friendly Artillery Con-
 centrations numbered &
 registered.



8mm Mortar primary tar-
 get numbered and re-
 gistered.



Mines, booby-traps and
 trip flares.




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DEFICIENCIES IN SMALL UNIT INFANTRY

COMBAT

1. The following errors and deficiencies in small unit infantry combat, frequently observed in recent operations in France, will be brought to the attention of all officers and men. All concerned will take necessary action to correct those deficiencies with the least practicable delay.

- a. Failure to fix and use bayonets in assault.
- b. Failure to use hand and rifle grenades in assault.
- c. Exaggerated use of squad column and column of squad columns on approach and even in attack.
- d. Inexcusable crowding and herding of men under fire.
- e. Failure to scout front and flanks.
- f. Flanking maneuvers of squads and platoons not wide enough. Flanking group not "sneaky" enough.
- g. No signal or command for assault; frequently resulting in no assault.
- h. Stupid exposure of 60mm mortars in open when ditches, walls, and other cover are available.
- i. Men ignorant of location of squad, platoon, and company CPs.
- j. Individual men moving forward, under threat of fire, do not select next place to drop and route to it, before getting up.
- k. Squads, groups, and individuals fail to move forward unless directed by platoon leader. Each unit (or individual) must move aggressively toward objective whenever possible without orders.
- l. Company and platoon attack orders seldom give a specific ground feature (and route to it) as objective.
- m. No attempt to close with enemy following artillery, cannon, mortar, or other concentrations.
- n. Many individuals, when fired on, fail to return fire. Our volume of small arms fire is ridiculously inadequate.



OVERLAY
 FRANCE 1/25,000
 314TH INFANTRY
 29 JAN 45


PLANS FOR COUNTERATTACK:

1. Plan A: Reserve battalion, one platoon of medium tanks attached will counterattack along routes shown in purple, to repulse any penetration and restore MLR.
2. Plan B: Reserve battalion, one platoon of medium tanks attached, will counterattack along road shown in green. One company to move along road as indicated and clear woods of any possible penetration with limited objective main road KALTENHOUSE - HAGUENAU. Battalion (-) to attack along road shown on overlay to repulse any penetration and restore MLR.
3. Unit commanders, to include companies, to make thorough reconnaissance to include all routes.
4. Bn CP - initial Command Post.

ROBINSON

OFFICIAL:

SCHULZE
 S-3



Patrol Plan
315th Inf 31 Jan 45
1/25,000

File

61
 30 Jan 45

S-3 REPORT

NO: 208
 MAPS: 1-000
 20-000

FROM: 0001 30 JAN 45
 TO: 2400 30 JAN 45
 PLACE: VIC WEITBRUCH
 DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE
 2200 30 JAN 45

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

SEE OVERLAY

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

SEE OVERLAY

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

314 INF ON L, 142 INF ON RT, 904 FA BN D/S (-1 PLAT)
 Co C 304 MED BN ATCHD Co A 304 ENGR BN
 ATCHD Co A 813 TD BN DIS Co C 304 ENGR
 BN DIS, BTRY B 353 AA BN (-) SUPPT.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

COLD-SNOW-CLOUDY

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:

UNIT REMAINED IN DEFENSIVE POSITION DURING PERIOD. Co F (-1 PLAT) MOVED TO MARIENTHAL IN BN RES. ROADS IN SECTOR CLEARED OF SNOW PREP. FOR RES. BN. TO MOVE TO ANY PORTION OF DIV. SECTOR AS C/A FORCE. SOME MORTAR + ARTY FIRE RCD. IN SECTOR DURING PERIOD. ATTEMPT TO TAKE PW LAST NIGHT UNSUCCESSFUL. ATTEMPT TO BE MADE AGAIN TONIGHT.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

EXCELLENT

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

SEE IPS + OVERLAY

Martin
 Capt Asst S-3

S-3 -315

HQ. 3rd Bn., 315th Inf.

Combat Patrol for 3rd Bn., 315th Inf.

Mission: Reconnoiter En. defensive position and capture prisoners.

Time of departure: 0100 31 Jan. 1945. Tentative

Route: see overlay.

Composition: Off. Patrol ldr. One radio operator. Two BAR men. Four

Sub Machine Guns. Two Riflemen. Two Engrs.

Equipment: Two man rubber boat. One SCR 300. White capes, white leggings

Armament: Two BARs. Five Sub Machine Guns. Two Rifles, M1. One pistol
Cal. .45. Two Carbines. Two Frag. Gretnades per man. Four WP
grenades.

Supporting fires: see overlay.

LCo 29
31 Jan 45

DECLASSIFIED

NVD 735017

AUTHORITY

BY Fw NARA DATE: 1-26

S-3-315

21

07

804 FAB

CANNON CO

1/2 SMOKE

1/2 HE

81MM SMOKE

BARD

OVERLAY SHOWING
PATROL ROUTE ARTY,
CANNON AND 81MM
CONCENTRATIONS

H-HOUR
LATER

3/315 - 30 JAN 45 1800

MAP OF FRANCE 1:50,000

-H-HOUR

10

19

Handwritten blue ink notes and symbols, including numbers and letters, scattered across the page.

315TH REGT.

OVERLAY SHOWING CHECKPOINTS
FOR PATROL ROUTES 30 JAN. 48
MAP OF FRANCE
SCALE 1:25,000

S-3 REPORT

NO: 206
MAPS: NO CHANGE

FROM: 0001 28 JAN 1945
TO: 2400 28 JAN 1945
PLACE: VIC WEITBRUNN
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE:
2000 28 JAN 1945

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

NO CHANGE

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

NO CHANGE

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

314th INF REG. 242nd INF ON (L) N; 142nd INF (36 DIV) ON R (S)
904 FA D/S; Co C 304 MED BN ATTCHD; Co A, 47 TR BN (- 1 pht) ATTCHD.
Co B 813 TD BN D/S. Co B (-) 304 ENGR BN (-) D/S

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

SNOW - COLD

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:

REMAINED IN DEFENSIVE POSITION THROUGHOUT PERIOD, IMPROVING POSITIONS. TD'S RE-LOCATED AFTER RELIEF OF Co C, WITH ADDITIONAL FIRING POSITIONS. Intermittent harassing arty fire in BISCHWILLER AND KALTENHOUSE. SOME NEBELWERFER FIRE RCD IN BISCHWILLER. LIGHT VEHICULAR TRAFFIC REPORTED IN OBERHOFFEN.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

EXCELLENT

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

See TP5

Hoover
May 5-3

S-3 REPORT

72
24 Jan 45

NO: 202
MAPS: 1/25000

FROM: 0001 24 JAN 45
TO: 2400 24 JAN 45
PLACE: VIC WEITBRUCH
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE
2400 24 JAN 1945

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

OVERLAY

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

OVERLAY

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

242 INF ON LEFT, 36 DIV (142 INT) on (R), 304 Eng (Co B)
D/S. Co E 304 Inf Bn attached. 311 FA Bn D/S, relief by 594 FA Bn (lost)
and 2 Btys (155) of 312 FA Bn

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

Cold, Snow, Hazy

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:

315 (-1st Bn) ordered to relieve 314th Inf in def.
sector vic Kaltenhouse - Bischwiller. Troops left
assbly area 1730, 2nd Bn relief completed 2030; 3rd
Bn relief completed 2240. Ev. generally quiet
in sector. Aery fired TOT and harassing missions.
Relief accomplished w/o incident. 1st Bn remains
in reserve in MARIENTHAL, for C/A purposes ZONE
242nd on 315th Inf.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:


EXCELLENT

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:


See TPRS

Hoover
Maj S-3

OVERLAY SHOWING AT DEFENCE
FOR 315TH INF. SECTOR
SCALE 1:5,000 26 JAN 45
Official Approval S-3



Overlay Showing A.T. Defence
 for 315th Sector.
 Date: 25 JAN
 Scale 1/25,000
 Official: Thorne S-3



11 21
 85
 25 Jan 45

TRAINING CIRCULAR }
No. 66 }

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 24 October 1944.

[TC 66]

(Effective until 24 October 1945 unless previously rescinded)

Point-designation grid.—1. Pending revision of FM 6-40, paragraph 286 of FM 6-40 is changed as follows: The dimension of the grid square is 1.44 inches. Delete all reference to 1.8 inches and substitute 1.44 inches. With grid square of 1.44 inches, the 1:25,000 scale is used in measuring and plotting point-designation grid coordinates. Delete all reference to 1:20,000 and substitute 1:25,000.

2. Pending revision of FM 21-25, page 102 and figure 126 of FM 21-25, 15 August 1944, are changed as follows: The dimension of the grid square is 1.44 inches. Delete all reference to 1.8 inches and substitute 1.44 inches.

3. Pending revision of FM 21-26, paragraph 105 of FM 21-26, 17 September 1941, is rescinded and the following paragraph is substituted therefor (Atlas Grid is no longer used):

105. POINT DESIGNATION.—a. Printing accurate grids on photographs is impracticable because of scale distortion. An arbitrary grid, known as the point-designation grid, sometimes is used. This grid has no relation to the actual scale or orientation of the photograph; it serves only for point or target designation, and normally is not suitable for measurement of distance or azimuth. For convenience, the dimension of the grid square is 1.44 inches. The 1:25,000 scale then can be used for determining and plotting the coordinates of points.

b. The point-designation grid may be printed on the photo, or the grid may be printed on a transparent sheet—the point-designation grid template—for use on photographs not gridded. It is essential that all concerned place the grid or template on the photograph in exactly the same manner. For vertical photographs the usual procedure is: turn the photograph so the marginal information, whether printed at top or at bottom, is in the normal reading position. The bottom of the photograph then is the edge nearest you. Draw the grid line AA through the fiducial marks at top and bottom of the photograph. Fiducial marks are also known as collimation marks. Draw the grid line MM through the fiducial marks on the sides. The intersection of these lines is the center of the photograph. Additional grid lines are drawn parallel to AA and MM at 1.44 inch spacing. Those parallel to and above MM are lettered NN, OO, PP, QQ, etc. Those parallel to and below MM are lettered ZZ, YY, XX, WW, etc. Lines to the right of AA are lettered BB, CC, DD, etc., and those to the left LL, KK, JJ, II, etc. When an oblique photograph is used, it is placed in the normal *photo-reading position*, and grid lines are placed as described above.

c. To determine the coordinates of a point, first indicate by two letters the intersecting grid lines to the left and below the grid square in which the point is located; then read right and up to get the two numerical coordinates, for example, KN7763.

[AG 300.7 (22 Oct 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

AGO 424B 610302°—44

TRAINING CIRCULAR }
No. 66 }

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 24 October 1944.

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
 Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
 Major General,
 The Adjutant General.

AGO 424B 610302°—44

88
29 Jan 45
S-3 REPORT

FROM: 0001 29 Jan '45
TO: 2400 29 Jan '45
PLACE: Vic WEITBRUCH
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE:
2100 29 Jan '45

NO: 207
MAPS: 1/25,000

1. OUR FRONT LINES:
No change (AT defense overlay)
2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:
No change (AT defense overlay)
3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:
314 Inf on L., 142 Inf on Rt. 904 FA Bn D/S, Co "C" 304 Med Bn atchd, Co "A" 47 Tk Bn (minus one plat) atchd, Co "A" 813 TD Bn D/S, Co "C" 304 Engr Bn D/S, Btry "B" 353 AA Bn (-) suppt.
4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:
Cold - clearer skies.
5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:
Defended in present position throughout period. Tks regrouped in MARIENTHAL. AT defense coordinated with TD support & minor changes made. Some veh & foot movement observed btwn Schirrheim and Sessenheim. Civilians observed leaving Oberhoffen going NE. Harassing mortar & arty fire in Bischwiller & Kaltenhouse. Some SP fire received vic Kaltenhouse. Unidentified planes over area.
6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:
Excellent.
7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:
See paragraph 5.


MARTIN

Capt., Asst S-3

AT Defense No Change.

Overall defense
Defense (no) AT
1/1/1978
1/1/1978
1/1/1978

07
19



1/1/1978
1/1/1978
1/1/1978

6
E

L
K

11
22



Sketch
 Fuller 36

39

18 Jan '45

Hatten

Blockhouse

Forest

Sketch showing
 German Tanks knocked
 out by 3d Squad,
 3d Platoon, Fuller
 AT Co.

Legend:


Official:

Vincen T A Carvingella
 Capt

German Tank

Blockhouse

15



22.

31/10/45

Official 77 Nov 11 day 5-2

50

6

EN FIRE ON CALL
TO GET
INTO TOWN

PATROL

FCG To SEND 15/MAN

DECLASSIFIED

NVD 735017

AUTHORITY

BY Fw NARA DATE: 1-26

(46)
14 Jan 45

(1)


ORAL INSTRUCTIONS issued to Liaison Officers at 0900 14 January 1945

1. 3-315 assigned zone of action of both 48 and 3-315. 3-315 to organize Tk-Inf teams.
2. 5 med tanks assigned to 3-315.
3. Balance of 48(-) assigned over-watching and C/Atk mission under control 48.
4. Building to building attack assigned to 3-315.


Map Scale
 Scale 1:50,000

38
 18 June 46

4/24/46
 1800




Official
 Howard A. Carvingale
 Command



Overlay Showing
 German Tanks Knocked
 out by 3d Squad 3d
 Platoon, Fuller AT Co.

Legend
 German Tank ---
 Road ---

File



4-2 FIRES
 over Jan 125000
 EN-1MB-
 (as PARD by 1410W)

Area to be
 saturated
 Area to be
 interdicted

Safety Line No
 No fires outside
 This Area except
 on C/A or observed
 Missions
 14 JAN 45
 DFPICIA7
 Hoover
 May
 5-3


File

46
 18 Jan 45

Mines laid by 125th Arm'd. Engr. Bn

Laid by 19th Div.
 Exact information
 not yet obtained.

Secret



Overlay

Hasty Mine Field Location & Mine Blocks

Map: 39-14 1+2 Scale 1:25,000
 gaps on roads provided with
 daisy chains 1700 yds

50

File

(4)

35th Infantry
 16 Jan 1945

19
 17 Jan 45

OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

1. a. In view of current reverses in other sectors, En. will defend tenaciously his present positions and C/A with strong forces of Inf. and armor. En. holds parts of RITTERSHOFFEN with est. force of 500 men, elmts of 21st Pz., 25th Pz.Gr. and possibly of 7th Para. Divs., supported by an est. six (6) tank or assault guns. En. secures high ground along his supply rte with an est. 300 men. En. occupies part of HATTEN with an est. 1000 Inf. and 8-10 tanks. A local C/A in RITTERSHOFFEN of one (1) Co. possibly accompanied by a flame throwing tank can be expected. A C/A of two (2) Bns. supported by 10-15 tanks is a possibility. For Arty support, En. has available six (6) to nine (9) Bns. of 105 and four (4) - six (6) Bns of 150mm plus unknown number of 120mm mortars.
 b. 315th Inf. (less 2nd Bn) 68th A.I.B. attachd, cont. atk. to clear town of RITTERSHOFFEN, 17 Jan. and organize def. line in prep. for continuation of atk to E on HATTEN. 2nd Bn, 315th and 62nd A.I.B. with one Co. med tks cont. atk HATTEN 170730. Co. "B", 2nd Chem Bn (4,2") attachd. 310th F.A. (reinf) dir suppt.
2. One (1) Co. - 1st Bn, 315th Inf. cross L/D at 170630 Jan.; gain foothold in NW edge town (area "A" - sketch) prior to 0700; cont. atk to SE to clear town (Order "B", "C"). One (1) Co., 1st Bn. supptd by one (1) Co. Med. Tks, cross L/D 170715; occupy, org., and def. hill 721.1 (overlay & sketch) Orgn. pos. indicated for defense of town, prep. to cont. atk to E. on order.
3. 68th A.I.B. (attachd to 1st Bn, 315th) resume atk 0700 to NE. Joine forces w/1st Bn, 315th and cont atk to SE to clear town ("B", "C") Attachd one (1) Plat Med. tks. Occupy position defensive position indicated, as ordered by CO, 1st Bn.
4. 3rd Bn, 315th (attachd one (1) Plat Med tks), atk by fire 170700, Jan. strong point vic. Church (area "C") Upon lifting of mortar barrage, atk. by fire and movement and overrun strong point; cont. atk to occupy area "D". Orgnize and occupy position indicated for def. of town, prep. to cont. atk to E. on order.
5. Cn. Co. - Normal support.
6. AT Co. prep. to occupy defensive position shown. Coord. A.T. def. of sector.
7. Co. "B", 2nd Chem Bn fire on areas "C" and "D" commencing 0700. Fires to lift at 0900 or on call of Bn. Observers w/eac atk Bn.
8. Arty Suppt. All fires within no fire area (overlay) cleared through 310th F.A. and this Hqs. Normal night harassing fires. Smoke to conceal operations when necessary.
9. Demonstration atks by CCB on L (N) flank 315th.
10. All MG's. .50 and 30 Cal. will be employed to max. advantage in atk. Use of flame throwers, demolition charges and grenades to facilitate rapid advance in house to house fighting. Refill sta. for flame throwers OBERBETSCHDORF.
11. Speed is the essence in this operation. All efforts must be expended by all units to assure rapid and successful completion of mission to allow sufficient time for preparation of defensive positions and plans for continuation of atk. Units will be prepared to repel C/A immediately upon reaching Obj.
12. 500 A.T. mines avail, KUHLENDORF at Co. "B", 125th Engrs. (CAPT. O'NEILL, Cmdg.) Personnel avail. for laying mine fields.
13. One (1) flame throwing tank avail at KUHLENDORF on order this Hqs.
14. Comm. - 1st Bn to 68 A.I.B. - 300 SCR. Wire & SCR-300 284 to 1st & 3rd Bns, SCR-300 to 2nd Bn; Wire, SCR-284 and Lm from CCA.
15. NO FRIENDLY PERSONNEL WILL WEAR ANY WHITE EQUIPMENT.
16. C.P. - NO change.
17. PW Col. Point at 123312.

SECRET

SECRET

Auth: CG 14 AD
Init: MB
Date: 15 Jan 45Hq CCA 14 AD
APO 446 U S Army
2230 15 Jan 45

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 23.

1. Tonight probing patrols with at least one bazooka per patrol will be pushed out by 3-315 and 68 to detect enemy forming up for atk and to locate and fire on his patrols, and on routes that can be penetrated to determine location of tanks in RITTERSHOFFEN.
2. Beginning at 0800 tomorrow small scale limited objective atks will be made by 68 continuing its advance thru the day. 3-315 will turn over B-68 and Plat A-68 to CO 68 tomorrow. Transfer to be completed as early as practicable but not later than 1800 tomorrow. Mutual arrangements will be made between units concerned.
3. 3-315 will continue its atk to N and NE in RITTERSHOFFEN, completing the operation set for this afternoon for the capture of the church and building to the N of the church, contingent on emplacing the 155 gun for further firing.
4. 48 after attaching a tank plat to each 3-315 and 68 will be prepared during the night to block roads to the west and at daylight in the morning to counter-attack either E or W of the mine field according to situation.
5. Use of radio for transmission of atk plan of any higher unit is prohibited. Atk orders of tank or similar units if to be executed without a moments delay only may be so handled.
6. CP CCA: No change.
7. Resupply fully tonight.
8. Be sure of all defenses.

KARLSTAD

OFFICIAL

Gentry
GENTRY

S-3

(2)



CO CTS

11

19 Jan 45

35


14

17

34

1

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
 2ND BN CTS
 19 Jan 45
 Map: FRANCE 1:25000
 Positions to be Occupied
 On Order. Fd G Cos
 Position for ① The
 Same As Shown For
 Their ② Position.
 " "



SECRET

SECRET
 : Auth: CO, SGA, 14 AD:
 : Init: PKSA
 : Date: 19 January 45:
 :

No. 19

Maps: No change.

S-3 PERIODIC REPORT

Hq CC "A", 14th Arm Div
 A.P.O. #446, U.S. Army
 200100 January 1945
 From: 190001 January 1945
 To : 192400 January 1945

1. Overlay.

2. Overlay.

3. Overlay.

4. Scattered clouds, occasional sleet and snow. Visibility ^{good} limited.

5. a. 315: 1st Bn in defensive position(overlay). 3rd Bn held positions in Rittershoffen. Patrols pinned down by heavy MG, automatic weapons, and sniper fire. 68 AIB held positions in Rittershoffen. Patrols sent to N part of town driven back by each time. Participated in attack by fire at 1500 by patrolling upon completion of fire by arty and tks.

b. 48: "B" co outposted SW edge of Rittershoffen with 3 tk each to 3-315 and 68. Remainder of Bn in CCA Res. One plat A-48 participated in an attack by fire at 1430 for thirty minutes from position vic 164342 firing on the NW corner of Rittershoffen. At 2000 A-48 (consisting of min of 8 tks) attached to TF LUCAS.

c. C-94 detached from 48 as of 1830 and attached to CCB.

d. C-125: CCA troops.

e. CP CCA: No change.

6. Good.

Excellent.

7. Held ground already gained. Patrols reached limited objectives before being driven back to Bn positions in Rittershoffen.

8. Tank and TD status:

Unit		Operationally Fit	Under repair		Lost During Period
			Fit in 24 hrs	Fit over 24 hours	
48 Tk Bn	M5(37mm)	9	0	2	0
	M4(75mm)	11	4	5	0
	M4(76mm)	23	0	1	0
	M4(105mm)	4	2	0	0
877 TD Bn	M18	2	1	0	0

Note: Does not include 5 med tks (B48) 3 75s and 2 76s at 7th Army Driving School.

KARLSTAD
 Comdg

OFFICIAL:

Gentry
 GENTRY
 S-3



119
18 Jan. 45

S-3 REPORT

8a

NO: 196
MAPS: $\frac{1}{25000}$

FROM: 0001 18 JAN 45
TO: 2400 18 JAN 45
PLACE: 120 333
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE:
2200 18 JAN 45

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

See OVERLAY

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

See OVERLAY

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

CCB 144 ON L, CCR 144 ON RT, (315 INF (-2ND BN) - ATCHD
COB 2ND CHEM. BN, 2ND BN 313 INF, 242 INF + 1 PLAT
TKS FR 48TR BN.) SUPPTD BY 310 FA BN, 2ND BN 315
ATCHD CCR. 68AIB DET. FR 1/315 1100 18 JAN.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

CLOUDY, WARMER - SOME RAIN

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:

2ND BN CONT. TO HOLD IN HATTEN - 3RD BN HELD IN RITTERSHOFFEN
AND WERE ABLE IN AFTERNOON TO PUSH AGGRESSIVE PATROLS
FARTHER INTO TOWN. MET A/W + S/A RESISTANCE. 1ST BN
ORG. DEF. LINE SW RITTERSHOFFEN. NO CONTACT MADE W/
CO B SINCE ATK ON RITTERSHOFFEN ON 17 JAN.
ARTY, MORTAR + FLAT TRAJECTORY FIRES RECEIVED IN
BOTH TOWNS DURING PERIOD. HOWEVER, SITUATION QUIETER
IN RITTERSHOFFEN THAN USUAL. FOUR EY. NE OF
RITTERSHOFFEN KNOCKED OUT BY ARTY FIRE DURING
PERIOD. ATK ON HATTEN FR E BY TKS + INF AT
1945 18 JAN. REPORT ALL QUIET AT 2135 18 JAN
AFTER CONSIDERABLE ARTY FIRE PLACED ON EY.
ACTIVITY.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

GOOD

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

SEE TP 5 + OVERLAY

Martin
Capt. Asst S-3

File

9

S-3 REPORT

NO:
LAPS: 197
25-000

FROM: 0001 19 JAN 45
TO: 2400 19 JAN 45
PLACE: VIC OBERBETSCHDORF
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE: 2200 19 JAN 45

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS: NO CHANGE

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS: NO CHANGE

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: CCB ON L, CCR ON RT, 315 INF
ATCHD CO B 2ND CHEM BNY 2ND BN 313 INF 242 INF
PLS 1 PLAT TRS FR 48TK BN, SUPPTD BY 310
FA BN 2ND BN 315 INF ATCHD CCR.

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD: CLOUDY - SOME RAIN + SNOW.

EY ATK ON HATTEN EARLY DURING
PERIOD UNDER CONTROL. DEMONSTRATIONS
BY FIRE BY 3RD BN + 48TK BN IN
RITTERS HOFFEN DREW HEAVY ARTY +
MORTAR FIRE. PATROL FROM 68 AIB
MET INTENSE M/G + SIA FIRE AFTER
ADVANCING 75-100 YDS. LATE IN PERIOD
MORE VEH. MOVEMENT BETWEEN BUHL
& HATTEN HEARD THAN EVER BEFORE.

GOOD

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY: SEE IP 5

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

Martin
Capt Asst S-3

File

S-3 REPORT

9a

100
20 Jan. 45

NO: 198
MAPS: 1/25000

FROM: 0001 20 JAN 45
TO : 2400 20 JAN 45
PLACE: VIC OBERBETSCHDORF
DATE & HR. OF ISSUE:
2200 20 JAN 45

1. OUR FRONT LINES:
IN PROGRESS W/DRAWING END OF PERIOD TO ASSEMBLY AREA
2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:
SAME AS 1. ABOVE
3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:
CCB ON L, CCR ON R, 315 INF (-2ND BN) ATTACHED ALSO
CO B 2ND CHEM BN, 2ND BN 313 INF, 242 INF,
1 PLAT TKS 48TK BN, SUPPTD BY 310 FA.
2ND BN 315 ATTACHED CCR UNTIL W/DRAWAL FR 1 HATTEN
COMPLETE.
4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:
CLOUDY, SNOW - COLD
5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:
ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD RESTRICTED
PRINCIPALLY TO ARTY, MORTAR + TK FIRE.
PATROLS SENT OUT IN RITTERSHOFFEN
MET S/A + MIG FIRE. UNIT ORDERED
TO MAKE W/DRAWAL DURING NIGHT TO
NEW AREA - 315 TO BE IN ASSEMBLY AREA.
MOVEMENT INITIATED AT DARK.
FY. FIRED SEVERAL STAR SHELLS OVER
SECTOR DURING W/DRAWAL.
6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:
GOOD
7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:
SEE IP 5

Martin
Capt. ASST. S-3


DECLASSIFIED

NND 735017

AUTHORITY

BY FW NARA DATE: 1-26

LEFT



315th INF
PATROL ROUTES
25 JAN 45

RIGHT

File

126
25 Jan 45

S-3 REPORT

NO: 203
MAPS: 1/25,000

FROM: 0001 25 Jan '45
TO: 2400 25 Jan '45
PLACE: Vicin Weitbruch
DATE & HOUR OF ISSUE

2200 25 Jan '45

1. OUR FRONT LINES:

See Overlay.

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:

See Overlay.

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:

242 Inf on L., 142 Inf on Rt. 304 Engr Co "B" D/S.
Co "C" 304 Med Bn atchd., 311 FA Bn D/S, reinf by 59
Armd FA Bn and two (2) btrys 312 FA Bn. Co "C" 25 Tk Bn
(-) atchd. Co "C" 813 TD Bn (-) in suppt. Btry "B"
353 AA Bn (-) suppt.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

Cloudy - cold.

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:

Unit remained in def position during period. Ey acti-
vity in sector limited to some movement of veh & person-
nel in OBERHOFFEN, attempt to rebuild bridge by patrol
vic KALTENHOUSE-CAMP DE OBERHOFFEN at 2050. Arty fire place
on activity and progress stopped. Some arty fire & SP
fire reported w/in sector. 1st Bn rem in res in vic
MARIENTHAL prep to C/A in 242 or 315 sector. Plan
initiated to use AA search lights in sector during
night. Minor changes in def plan within sector made.

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

Excellent.

7. RESULT OF OPERATIONS:

See para 5 & overlay.

Martin
MARTIN

Capt., Asst S-3

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS
315th Inf., 25 Jan. 45

103
25 Jan 45

1. PATROLS:

- a. Each Co. on the line will send patrols guiding along stream line in the Co. sector on the following schedule and direction:

2000 - From Left to Right
2230 - From Right to Left.
2400 - From Right to Left.

0215 - From Left to Right
0400 - From Right to Left.
0545 - From Left to Right.

b. Mission:

- (1) Detect and engage any hostile patrols or infiltrations.
- (2) Report on enemy activity observed or heard with special emphasis on troop movements, vehicular movements, movements of tracked vehicles and indications of assembly of troops.

c. Patrols will wear white capes.

2. CIVILIAN RESTRICTIONS:

- a. Curfew, 1730 to 0700 daily. Those civilians who, are not refugees, must have a special pass from G.A. to travel. Refugees do not go toward the En. lines.
- b. Any suspicious persons will be evacuated through P.W. channels to CHU.

3. REPORTS:

- a. SOP - report every two (2) Hours if negative and without delay if positive.
- b. Patrols - w/o delay upon return.

Patrols cancelled

SCHRIENER,
Major, S-2